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ABBREVIAT IONS
A/C Aircraft
ACARS Automated Communications Addressin6 and Reporting System
ADI Attitude Director Indicator
AFDS Autopilot Flight Director Systert
ALT Altitude
APP Approach Mode of AFDS
APU Autilliary Power Unit
A/T Autothrottle
ATC Air Traffic Control
C/B Circuit Breaker
CDU Control /Display Unit (Flight Management System)
C'SSD Command Male of AFDS
CRS Course Direction
CRT Cathode Ray Tube
C'A, S Control Wheel Steering mode of AFDS
EADI Electronic Attitude Director Indicator
EEC Electronic Engine Control
EFIS Electronic Flight Instrument System
EHSI Electronic Horizontal Situation Indicator
E?CAS Engine Indication and Crew Alerting System
ELEV Elevator
I--PR Engine Pressure Ratio
FAR Federal Aviation Regulations
FD Flight Director
FLCII Flight Level Change mode of AFDS
F%iC Flight Management Computer
FOSS Flight Management System
rMST Flight ?Management System Trainer
FO First Officer
GPWS Ground Proximity Warning System 1HDG Heading (also a mode of AFDS)
HLD Hold
HST Horizontal Situation Indicator
HUD Head Up Display
IAS Indicated Air Speed
ILS instrument L—nding System
ENS Inertial Navigation System
LNAV Lateral Navigation (mode of F1MS)
LOC Localimr
MCP Mode Control Panel
RWY Runway
SID Standard Instrument Departure
SPD Speed (a -node of the AFuS) f
THRTI_ Throttle
,I-MC Thrust Management Computer
TO Ta::eoff
V MC Visual Meteorologiczl Conditions
VNAV Vertical Navigation (a m.-fde of the FMS)
VOR VHF Omnidirectional Radio Range ff
V/S Vertical Speed (also a mode of the AFDS)
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SUMN ARY
New cockpit technology is continually required for the airlines to remain competitive, and the
manufacturers respond to this need. A historical view of the introduction of new technology
suggests that the change, have not always pone as planned, and that there have been reactions
to the new technology that were not anticipated. This report describes the first phase of a
joint airlint/NASA study which was undertaken during the introduction of a new technol-
ogy aircraft, the R-767. This first phase had several objectives: to identify any adverse reac-
tions ;.o the new technology should any develop (none was found}; to provide a "clearing
house` of informatian for the airlines and pilots on experiences during the introductory
period; to provide feedback on airline training programs for the new aircraft; and to provide
field data to NASA and other researchers to help them develop principles of human interaction
with automated systems.
Three airlines and their pilots agreed to participate in the study. Data were obtained through
more than 100 questionnaires returned by pilots, the direct observation and interviews with
pilots and check airmen, and attendance by a NASA observer at the ground schools of the par-
ticipating airlines.
There are two points concerning the results that deserve particular emphasis. First, the data
were taken during the early introduction of the aircraft and the conclusions apply only to
that periA. Second, although the 13-767 was the only aircraft in the stud y, discussions with
operators of the A310 (another new-technology-cockpit aircraft) have confirmed very similar
experiences. Thais, the following conclusions, while specifically mentioning the B-767, are
likely to be .alid for the introductory period of the A310:
1. Most the pil^*s enjoy flying the &767 more than they enjoy flying the older air-
planes.
2. The pilots accept the new cockpit technology, and they choose to use it because
they find it useful.
3. The pilots are aware of the possible loss of flying skill with the presence of auto- I
mation, and they hand-fly (usually with flight director) to prevent this loss The
data collected in this study do not indicate any loss of skills.
4. The primary points of confusion or surprise were autothrottle/autopilot interac-
tions; the autopilot turning the "wrong way" or not captu-ing the course; and
_	 achieving desired results with the Flight Management System/Control Display
Unit (FMS/CDC).
5. The pilots felt training for the FMS/CDU could be unproved, and they especially
wanted more "hands on" experience. More training on the mode control panel, and
more hand flying were also mentioned.
o. Information, especially "techniques," may not always be getting from the system
designers to --e l i ne pilots.
7. Flying any airc;,ft with sophisticated equipment and high levels of automation
allows distractions that cause a loss of monitoring performance.
PRECEDING PACE BL,\NK NOT FIf,,gF.D
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A. Many pilots should be trained to "turn it off" and not try to "program" their way
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out of an anomalous situation.
9. These field data confirm some existing human factors principles, suggest a new
principle, and raise questions requiring further research.
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INTRODUCTION
L-
	 Background
New aircraft technology is continually required for the airlines and manufacturers to remain
competitive. Most of the time the new technology takes the form of small, "add-on" systems
to existing aircraft such as the Automated Communications Addressing and Reporting System
(ACA-2S) or Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS). infrequently, there is a dramatic
change in cockpit technology, as with the introduction of the 11-767 and Airbus A310.
The Operators' View
Based on previous experience with new technology, it was expected that there would be con-
comitant changes required in the role of the crew, piloting techniques, procedures, and train-
ing. It was generally „ciceived that previous conversions to new technology did not always
go smoothly; that many airlines experienced higher-than-expecte,! training costs; and that
some pi.ots had expel ienced difficulty in the transition to the newer wide-body jets (the L-
1011 and DC-10). There have been several explanations offered for this_ certainly, the flight
guidance systems on these aircraft are more complex than those of their predecessors, but it
has also been noted that the captains transitioning to these aircraft had not been to school in
periods of 10 to 15 yr, and this may have contributed to some of the difficulties.
As new technology in any field is developed, there are some events that were seemingly not
anticipated by the designers. The GPWS, although admittedly introdu(.ed into service before
man}- felt it was ready, has caused pilots to turn it off because of the high false-alarm rate of
the system M iener and Curry, 1980). Subsequent changes in the alarm logic and display
logic have modified this this situation substantially. The Inertial Navigation System (INS) pro-
vides another example. It is true that, as automatic navigators, they navigate more accurately
and more economically than manual navigators, but the class of navigation errors has changed
so that a measurable fraction of errors occur due to the insertion of incorrect data and/or
movement of the aircraft while the INS is aligning itself. Both types of incidents have caused
aircraft to takeoff: only to nave to return to the airport because of these .nappropriatt actions.
A third example of an unanticipated side effect of automation has beet. observed by the air-
lines when pilots transitioned from first-o fficer on a wide body aircraft, with significant levels
of automation, to upgrade to captain on a narrow-body aircraft, with less automation (Wiener
and Curry, 1980). At first, there was a higher than expected failure rate, but this has dimin-
ish;^d after pilos sorted preparing themselves 1--Fore the transition by performing more
manual flying on the wide body aircraft. Many pilots have heard of others' experience in this
area and have altered their own use of' the autopilot to avoid the ap parent loss of skills.
The Human Factors View
In man gy- respects the technology of human factors has not kept pace with the technology of
the cockpit. There is a significant body of knowledge on how to design displays and controls
— material on which manual systems are based — but there is little material to help the
human-factors practitioner with the design of interfaces to complex devices. It has been felt
by many obtxrvers that the performance of such s ystems will b> determined less by tradi-
tional manual pilo,in2 skills, but more by the pilots' decision making behavior (vhat mode
should I use?} their knowledge of the systems (is this thing working correctly?); their nroni-
. 	 taring behavior (keystrokes entered now may influence the system 5 hr later} and crew coor-
dination (setup and muniur ng of the systems and other members of the crew).
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The job of the systems designer and operator is made even more complicated since many out-
comes of the design and operation (such as the loss of skills described earlier) do not emerge
until a considerable amount of experience with the new equipment has been gained. This is
precisely the type of information that cannot be obtained in simulation, the traditional design 	 i
tool.	 1
In short, new human-factors techniques are required to assist in the design of new cockpit
technology.
Study Objectives
The obi-ctives of the joint airline/NASA study were as follows:
1. To identify any unanticipated side effects of the new technology.
2. To provide feedback to the carriers on their training related to the new cockpit
technology.
3. To help the exchange of operational experience among carriers.
4. To provide quantitative data on the human-factors a-soects of the new technology.
5. To provide field study information for later development of human-factors "princi-
ples" of automation.
DESCR-D'TION OF THE STUDY
The study was conducted with the help and cooperation of hundreds of other individuals
within the three participating airlines. The major sources of information used in the study
are outlined in this section.
Ground School
The NASA observer attended the full (2 wk) ground school of one airline, and 1 week periods
at each ground school of the other two airlines; these periods coincided with instruction of
Flight Guidance, instrumentation, and the Flight Management System. The observer did not
take the oral exam or any simulator training, but he did observe three 4-hr simulator training
sessions
Pilot Volunteers
Pilot volunteers from the three participating airlines were solicited from those who attended
767 transition training. A procedure was established with the carriers whereby the anonym-
ity of each pilot wo:i d be preserved by having him adopt an identity code number. This was
necessary to establish identincation for a possible second round of questionnaires. Invitations to
participate in the study, including a five-page question-and-answer booklet, were prepared for
each airline. initially the invitations to participate were distributed when the pilots enrolled
in the ground school for transition training. Later this wrs changed so that the pilots received
material after their simulator training, either before or pj , .t after their initial operating experi-
ence.
Questionnaire
The primary data-collection device was the questionnaire (see appendix A). Over 100 returns
were received and 102 were used for most of the analyses. The questionnaire consisted of
three parts-
Frequency-of-Use Table
This part was designed to to determine what features were being used by the pilots, and how
frequently they used these fea tures-
Open-Ended Questions
The open-ended questions were designed to obtain information on confusing aspects of the Sys-
tems; the features and stisterns that the pilots like and find useful; cl aracteristics that they
don't like-, the aspects of the cockpit they would change if they could; ..nd their opinion about
the training they received.
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Attitude Survey
This portion of the questionnaire consisted of 36 statements about the pilots' opinions on auto
mation and flying in general, and the airplane in particular; *.)e pilots responded on a five-
point "agree--disagree" Likert Scale.
tT
Interviews and ;`Meetings
Informal interviews were held 'with approximately 20 pilots and 8 check pilots. Each inter-
view lasted from0.5 to 1.5 hr. hours.
Progress report meetings were held at each of the three participating airlines. Attendees of
these meetings consisted of representati ies from flight operations management, training, line
pilots, and check airmen. These progres reports seemed to have a catalytic effect, since they
always evolved into a spirited discussion among all attendees.
Cockpit Observation
The NASA observer few as cockpit observer on one training flight (two pilots received train-
ing on this fl ight), two segments during which a captain was receiving line training, and
approximately 40 segments with line pilots operating the aircraft in normal line operation.
Internal Documentation
The airlines made available any pilot reports of irregularities or incidents that occurred.
s
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RESULTS
Questionnaires
Respondents
A total of 104 questionnaires had been received between February 22, 1983 and July 31, 1983
(the cutoff date for the analysis). Two of the questionnaires could not be identified with a
I	 specific airline, so they have not been included in the analysts. The distribution of responses
ti by airline, position (captain/first officer), total flying time, and time in the 767 is shown in
Table 1. An interesting fact is that a majority of the respondents were captains, whereas our
past experience has been that first officers are usually more likely to participate in studies of
this type.
Frequency-oj-Use Table
The frequency-of-use table was distributed in two forms (see Appendix A) because of some
ambiguities in the instructions and some apparent inconsistencies in the responses. These
inconsistencies make it difficult to draw conclusiors from these data alone, but these data are
useful for confirming results suggested by other sources. See Appendix B for details.
Open-ended Questions
Without a doubt, the answers to the open-ended questions vVere the most difficult to extract
and summarize, but the y vieided extremely useful information. Included in this category of
responses were any notations from the comment column of the frequency--rif-use table, or
comments from the pilot o pinion portion of the questionnaire. These additional comments
were solicited, and were quite useful.
After approximately 30 or so questionnaires were carefully examined, several categories of
response began to emerge. The responses to the open-ended questions are shown in Table 2,
and have been grouped into 'Features Liked. Features Sussing or Not Liked, Points of Confusion
or Surprise, and Training. Not included in these responses are those comments relating to
human engineering and cockpit environment issues, or comments regarding the implementa-
tion of a particular feature if they were not pertinent to the present study.
The narrative responses below are complete. They are brief because an essay response was not
requested, nor was space provided. Nonetheless, they do convey the pertinent information.
Features Liked The pilots felt positively toward the Autopilot Flight Director System
(AFDS) and Autothrottle (A/T) System. When asked what feature they liked about the AFDS
and autothrottle system, the pilots' responses involved the general concept of autothro*tle and
speed control_
"A/T, saves fooling around setting power"
"speed control without constant monitoring"
"reliability and flexibility (ie., variety of ways of achieving an objective"
-9-
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"automatic changeover to .SO mach from 3W knots and vice verve"
"throttles eery handy in terminal area"
"all"
They also liked the AFDS and Thrust Management System during takeoff when the possibil-
ity of overboosting the engines is negated by the Electric Engine Control (EEC). Also men-
tioned were the reduced workload, altitude-capture, and altitude-select features:
"like TO power feature"
"TO and climb"
"with EEC the ability to keep engine at proper N1 without having to set power
manually"
"autothrottle overpower protection"
"altitude capture at preset speed on descent"
"reduced workload; correct power is set"
"saves time and effort setting different thrusts'
"enables the pilot to narrow : ttention pattern when necessary to concentrate on
most important objectives"
"ease of operation with reduction in workloau
The Electronic Flight Instrument System (EFIS), or Attitude Director Indicator (AW and
Horizontal Situation Indicator (HSI) Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) displays received enthusiastic
response. Most of the comments were general in nature, and referred to the information on
the displays and the clarity of the displays
"I can't describe it, but there is something visually pleasing about the CRT
presented instruments and Flight Director"
"Easy to read, and all info readily available"
"Very bright--always know where you are
"Good displa y —easy to read, and a wealth of information"
Specific mention was often made of the map dis^lay
"The map movie and the HSI is a wonderful tool"
_1a
"Page missing from available version" 
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"multitude of capabilities"
y"works «ell, useful"
"total amount of information is great"
"ability to%urn my map!"
In addition, two pilots specifically pointed out the advantage of having the route displayed on
the CRT map dislay, a combination of the Eh1S and INS capabilities.
"being able to string out the route with few entries"
"ability to build a map presentation"
PICAS The Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System also received many favorable, if
general, comments about the quality and quantity of information on the display.
"good, easily scanned display, readily seen from any seat/cockpit position; excellent
alerting system"
"warning and annunciation of practically everything"
"immediate info on status of airplane"
"clarity of and ease of reading the display"
"much attention in small space; warning system gets attention"
"quick glance comprehension of A.'C system status"
Specifically mentioned by several pilots were the explicit display of engine limits as 'tivell as
the ability to monitor a large number of variables.
"anti-ice & exceedence displays and TMC [thrust management computer] combina-
tion"
"limit displays"
all engine limits v. -ell displayed; no numbers to rememoer"
"monitorino capability"
"cautions and warnings"
"annunciations for prompt attention"
-12-
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"...engine displays and controls"
"constant monitoring of systems"
"alerts crew to any malfunction, and [1) like the call system (red, yellow)"
"the needle style of display catches the eye when something changes [com^erred to]
digits"
"color changes with warning/caution"
Features Not Liked or Missing There were not many features relating to the present study
iliat the pilots either did not like or felt were missing. An almost traditional complaint of
computer users is the slow response time, and these pilots were no excep • ion. usually, the
complaint concerned their time in the terminal area where they per,;eived fast flight crew
response as a necessity due to ATC changes:
"sometimes slow to accept information and update display"
"they didn't make it sophisticated enough—it is too slow"
"sometimes takes too long to bring up system and execute it"
"difficulty and length of time to reprogram approach once it is activated"
"seems a bit cumbersome at times—making changes for approach (as controiiers are
prone to do)"
"dislike being unable to change approaches quickly; need a way to clear out old
approach in one step, so that new one can be inserted quickly"
Pilots from airlines that did not use mechanical checklists felt they would be useful, and
many thought a checklist should be on the EICAS.
"checklists, emergency and irregular procedures should appear in conjunction with
key events (e.g., gear down, engine failure, etc.)"
"checklist on control column plate holder"
Others felt that the the circuit breakers and spare light bulbs should be within reach of the
pilots: even though the design philosophy i)recludes the necessity of needing these, the exigen-
cies of line operation made the pilots think otherwise
"have spare bulb box within reach when seated"
-*- .0
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"place circuit breakers in place where one pilot didn't have to get out of his seat to
reset"
"the most important [cockpit channel is.to  bring Lll controls, spare bulbs, C Bs. etc.
to within reztch of pilots ... very important for two man crest-"
"move the spare bulbs ,vhere 1 zan get to them. Way in bac'.; is no good or. final
with a blank gear down indicator
"«'e had b,;th lights in the right main gear out on final approach and had to go
around while the FO got out of his seat and found bulbs in the dark. Move spare
bulb supply or have a second supply
Points of Confusion or Surprise The first three General Questions yielded most of the
responses relating to points of confusion or surprise, especiall y question number 3. Onl y the
more significant categories will be described here.
Autothrortle-V/S-SPU Interaction A significant number of pilots repo:tea confusion on
the interaction of pitch autopilot and autothrottles.
"seems easy to turn eff autothrottle intentionally and then get it back by getting
into a speed mode and not realizing it at once"
'sometimes autothrottles reconnect when not expected to, even though they are
working normally"
` occasional misunderstanding of FLCH capability with [autothrottle] turned oft
"cannot alwa ys obtain zero thrust; whv?"
"some confusion as to when A/T will reengage after manual disconnect"
` trying to lose altitude with speed brakes, and then throttles power up the
engines"
"once aircraft leveled at uncalled for altitude, and autothrottle did not respond"
"[have observed] confusion between SPD on A. , T and SPD on pitch, and man y simi-
lar problems"
"descending in CNID, V/S, throttles at idle, autothrottles disconnected but armed.
[?Mode control panel], airspeed is well be''-3w existing speed. IKhen 1 select SPD the
autothrottles come out of idle. As far as I am concerr.Ld, this is not logical. Result: I 	 f
disconnect A./T."
"interface between V/S and SPD is bad—w,m't let throtue, cone back to idle and 	 1
then [throttles are too) slow to react."
` Autothrottfe is difficult to use properly, particularl y in use vtv ith descents. When
manual throttles are used, they stav NvIierever you put them. With A/T, it is	 ^	 =
necessary to constantly check power which actually increases workload."
l
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rSpeed Sync at FLCff Engagement A szemingly r-fated comment is the speed synchroni-
zation at the time Flight Level Change (FLCH) is engaged. Pegardless of the value displayed
in the speed-select window at the tirac I=LCI1 is engaged, this displayed value is changed to
the existing speed and the pitch autopilot holds the ex ling IA& The autothrottles advance to
maximum allowable thrust (if climbing) )r reduced thrust (if descending). Most pilots who
reported this confusion felt the target speed should have been that which was displayed in
the window at the time of engagement.
f ircro ft. Turns "Wrong lt'ay" or Des No:ECapture pilots reported that while on autopi-
lot the airc:dit turns the wrong way, especially upon locahzer intercept or after crossing a
w•aypom, or that the 1_tiAV system did not engage at ail.
"twice approaching XXa Rwy ILS12; once the aircraft leveled at uncalled for alti-
tude, and autothrottle did riot respond; second time, aircraft began non-specified
climbing right turn after tracking in "APP" mode on ILS (autothrottle was Loop).`
"hard pitch down in terminal area could not be explained."
"autothrottle (1) took off at flare; (2) started [go-around] at 400' on approach"
"approach to YYY I1S22R:rircraft turned about 40 degrees right of approach
course just prior Er, touter marker]—no apparent reason for malfunction!
the autothrottles occasionall y don't engage during 10 and -1Lnb; the automatics
occasionaLy don't properly loo's on during leca!izer capture."
' vlien using the directlintercept, a number of pilots, including myself, have for-
gotten that the active wavpoint must be ahead, not behind. Aircraft will not
intercept desired course. In si,-nilar situation, aircraft will turn track to active
waypoint behind, (if you let it). This has 'surprised' several of us."
"We were cleared direct Z'ZZ We used the fix key to define all of the abeam way
points. We activated the route. Subsequentl y, we were given an off course vector
for traffic. When we were again cleared on course, we did not pass within 25
miles of WWW, so the aircraft started to go back to W_'%VN'."
"Enroute New York over TIT, [the FIMS] suddenl y drew a perfect 360 degree cir-
cle and immediately started to turn."
"twice when in approach mode at YYY, the autopilot tun( to intercept localizer
when 5 miles or more to go. When reset on ap proach moK actually approaching
localizer, flew through completely."
"Have seen A/P 'capture' an LLS while still at least 5 miles away. Have also seen
A/C start to turn the wrong way to capture a radial
"Twice the heading select, when activated, has begun a turn in the wrong direc-
tion
"Locked onto LOC, followed by di engage and ts:-n away from LOC tours`." 1
1
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"Had the aircraft start a turn at a waypoint when it should not have while in
LNAV. Probably was an old route still in CDU that was not properly erased."
"In LNAV, airplane started out on excursion :ur no known reason—it happened
twice, both at waypoints_"
* Unexplained turns away from the LNAV course magenta line. Also no capture of
certain departure SID, although they were adequately displayed."
An obvious drawback of voluntary reports such as this is that it is not always passible to iso-
late the cause of these events, e.g., system setup error, system malfunction, or incorrect
knowledge of the system itself. The same situation exists with the reports about unselected
mode changes. The following reports are typical:
"had MCP switch from FLCH to V/S 3 times."
"the system has switched from FLCH to vrrt <r,ri. twice."
It is likely that the events happened as reported, but it it is also difficult to isolate causes from
such brief reports.
]leading Display on Track Up Map Eleven pilots reported confusion between the head-
ing orientation and the track up nature of the map display; as they describe it, this almost
alv.,ays occurs during vectoring to the terminal area tvthrn they are controlling aircraft head-
ing, not track.
"Flying a HDQ when initially checking out on A/C when in map mode."
"Heading info is hard to get used to. All of us have trouble finding heading info."
"Track up' presentation disconcerting when trying to maintain heading manually " 	 +	 ,
"Pilots fly using heading, engineers use track. Heading should he prominently
displayed at top of map
Training
Four of the pilots felt their training was adeq uate and did not require any changes.
1,'h1SiCDi] The great majority, however, had at least a few comments to make, espe-
cially regarding the FMS/CDl', and the type of training desired.
"[more] use of CDU, i.e., 'rules' of CDU--,hat it will and won't do, using all the
different ways to get a job done"
"[more) CDU. CDU. CDL'_the simulator wasted incredible tune because no decent
CDU training device [was available]." 	 {
more emphasis on FNIC; need F%1C trainer"
J	 ^
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without a doubt, the FMS and CDU should receive much more emphasis.
,More practice and hands on a fully operational 'identical' 1--MS/CDU and practice
to full proficiency'
"...Insight into the capabilities of the [F =MS/CDU) systems would be better obtained
through an--actual iata-based trainer that operated in reel time and allowed trial
and error: Inputs/Mlistakes/Corrections/ Learning!"
Related comments referred to the specific exercises that they felt would be useful:
"[more) CDU use in simulator with emphasis on everyday line use combined with
typical lire : tTC clearances."
"A little less FMC—or a more practical approach!
"l.,ess emphasis on V\AV (since it's not installed), more emphasis on CDU- program-
ming."
AFDS Training Several of the pilots would have liked more training with the AFDS
and Mode Control Panel.
"The simulator should establish basic flying skills with the AFDS prior to using
the automatics."
"[more) operation of all automatics. A hands-on mockup is needed in ground
school."
%more) autoflite system. 1- procedures for use were drilled slowly in a step by
step fashion, particularly during TO profile and approaches, if these procedures
were down cold before simulator training, simulator would be much easier'
'[An) absolute necessity [is] basic AFDS training! Why do we have this autopilot?
What is it trying to do? 'What is the design philosophy? Nceded after this: DRILI!
DRILL' DRILL' with no other simulator movement. just AFDS..."
More line oriented crew duties (log book, set up, comm, etc.)
Additional Flying A significant number of pilots wished to hzive more experience hand
flying the siniulatar, and several suggested the order of presentation of the material.
"Band flying needs more emphasis. Total time should be increased. Co-pilots should
get equal time."
"More manual flying. This airplane will fly just fine Nvithout the AIDS and
autothrottles."
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Pilot Opinion Questionnaire
The pilots responded to 36 statements and were asked to circle one of five answers to describe
how they felt about the statement: strongly agree; slightl,, agree; neither agree nor disagree;
slightly disagree; or strongly disagree. Their reslx-nses were examined to determine if there
was any correlation with the following variables: airline, total flying time, flying time in the
767, and their position. (e.g., captain or first officer). In addition, a factor analysis was per-
formed to determine if there .sere anv underlying dimensions to the response to the 36 ques-
tions.
A'.1 respc.tses were pooled and the results appear in Table 3 for each of the 36 questions.
Airline Differences A contingency table analysis was first performed to determine whether
or not any gross differences existed between airlines. The responses were pooled into a 3 X 3
matrix consisting of the three airlines and the three responses "agree./neither/disagree". There
results were not significantly different from those expected by chance, thus returns were
combined across airlines for later analyses.
?text, each of the 36 questions was separately analyzed for airline differences by constructing
a 3 (airline) X 2 (agree/disagree) contingency table for each of the 36 questions. The "neither
agree nor disagree" categor y was omitted because it typically is used to indicate an inability to
respond to the question as well as a neutral feeling about the statement. The questions for
which the pilots of different airlines gave similar answers and dissimilar answers are shown
in Table 4. "The chi-square probability should be interpreted as the probability that the air-
lines had identical responses to the questions.
Captains Versus First Offcers Fach of the 36 questions was examined w determine if cap-
tains and first offices responded ditl-erentl y . This was done b y constructing a 2 (captain-FO)
X 2 (agree/disagree) contingency table for each of the 36 statements. There were 11 state-
ments in v:hich the captains and first officers agreed (see Table 5), and there was sifnificant
disagreement on two statements: the captains agreed (and the F(k disagreed) that the autoland
capability enhances safety, and that "automation frees me of much of the routine, mechanical
parts of flying so I can concentrate more on managing the flight".
Total Flying Time and 767 Flying Time An analysis was performed on the answers
received to the 36 op_nion questions to determine the correlation of total fl y ing time, 767
flying time, and captain/first officer differences with these answers. This was by per-
forming a discriminant  analysis to see if the three variables could discriminate between the
t ,vo categories (agree/disagy ree) on each question. While there %vas some effect for a few- state-
ments (e.g., 767 time predfctcd agrecment with the statement "I can find the exact location of
important controls and switches without any hesitation"), in general, the percentage of correct
classifications of responses on the bads of these three variables was alwa ys less than 700',:, so
there seems to be almost no detectable relationship between the agree/disagree responses and
the three variables Note, however, a contingency table analysis did detect differences
between captains and first officers on two of the 36 questions (see above).
Factor Analysis The responses to the 36 questions were subiected to a factor analysis (there
were 96 complete responses for this purpose). An examination of the percent variance
. ' explained versus the namber of factors showed no significant "knee" in the curve, but tat fi
factors explained slightly more than 60 <tb of the variance. These R factors were then rotated
nonor•thogonalIN to simplify the interpretation of the loading matrix; the factor loadings are
shown in Table 6. This analysis is performed by the statistical prokram; it sorts the 36 ques-
tions by the magnitude of the loading, if the loading is greater than 0..^and sets loadings of less
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than 0.25 to zero. The questions below the dotted line in the table had the largest loading on
that factor although the loading was between 0.25 and 0-50 in magnitude.
It is encouraging to find that the factors are easily identified, but discouraging to find that a
large number of factors are required to explain the variance. '.• his seems to be another man-
ifes tation of the complexit y e; the human factors of automation.
Interviews and Meetings
In addition to the results previously reported under the open-ended q uestions, the following
points emerged in discussions with t:le check pilots during interviews cr meetings:
1. Several of the pilots would have liked more training with the AFDS and Mode
Control Panel.
2. The first few trainees did not have a good grasp of the F',1S/CJU when they
reached line training, but this situation improved after each airline gained experi-
en ce.
3. Two check a.rmen commented on the duties other than flying. Both felt that some
crew members mr,2ht get overloaded if these duties were not spread out in time.
Th's was especiall y true when some equipment (e.g., ACAS) was not werking.
One check airman said that the two man crew should be given extra consideration
(e.g,., different flight-plan forms, equipment to carry).
4. Some crew members have had difficult y adapting to the two man crew concept.
This seems to depend substantially on previous experience, e.g., narrovx• -body two-
man experience versus wide-boJy three-man crews. One first officer said "there is
nothing worse than a three-man-captain in this two-man airplane", indicating, as
others did, that the captain must take an active role -,A-ith extra duties when he is
the pilot not flying.
Cockpit Observation
The experience of riding with crews on normal line trips was an extremely important part of
the study and yielded information and insight that helped organize many facets of the study.
Although nc quantitative data were taken has per the ground rules for the study), the follow-
ing points wire noted:
1. The pilots VI ere extremely enthusiastic about the airplane, and took pride in its
performance and the capabilities of the equipment.
2. They were quite facile with the CDU for some tasks, e.g., building new waypoints
for abeam fixes. 'Ibcir performance in other CDU operations was more variable,
such as setting up crossing fixes, and depended on their experience level.
3. On at least four of the segments we experienced the early-capture-at-low-altitude-
phenomenon repor-,.ed by the pilots. In every case, both pilots were surprised by
the sudden reduction in thrust as the aircraft leveled off, even though they had
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selected a higher altitude by that time.
4. There were manv occasions when it was observed that tt.e automatics were not
performing the, task desired b y the pilot. Most of these situations were minor
discrepancies and were resolved by reprogramming the AFDS or FMS. A few of
the pilots turned the autopilot completely off and hand-flew while re-engaging the
systems. In at least six other instances, the pilot flying tried to rectify the situation
by changing modes or setting new values in the AllS or F^1S, but these actions
either did not immediately improve the situation or they made matters worse. In
these cases the pilot seemed to become more uncertain of the true situation as he
did more programming.
Incident Reports
Two incident reports were examined for the relevant human factors and automation elements.
The first incident involved an unselected mode change from Flight Level Change (I'I.CIi) to
vertical speed with subsequent airspeed decay. The alerting and warning system remained
silent until the appropriate angle of attack limits were reached. Then, as the pilot described it,
"all hell broke loose" with the sudden onset of alerts. The pilot reported he was able to think-
of several reasons why the airspeed indicator was incorrect, even though it was correct. This
follows a human tendency to retain the previous hypothesis during these first few seconds.
Another crew member was involved in an in-flight spool-down of engines, resulting in tem-
porary loss of the CRT displays. When the CRT displays were present, the EICAS was filed
with messages, and he had difficulty assimilating the information except for the only red men-
age (a cabin altitude warning). Ile could not discriminate between the second-level caution
nessages (yellow, starting in the left margin.) and the advisory messages (yellow, indented one
.pace from the margin). Furthermore, he had many questions: "I turned on the -%Pl, is it
:oming up to speed or not? Are the engines really running or are they u'indmilling'" Ile
elt another crew member might have been useful, not as much for executing procedures as
or helping diagnose the problem.
1+
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DISCUSSION
Pilot Acceptance of the New Technology
The Airplane in General
The pilots feel pcsAively about the airplane. 'lore than 86% agreed they "enjoy flying the 767
more than the older aircraft" (#11). In response to a statement (#34) about the en;nyment of
hand flving, one pilot remarked "It's a sweetheart—tough to turn it over to automation!" This
enthusiasm was also evident during the pilot interviews and the cockpit observations when
the pi',ots also mentioned the aircraft performance (high climb rate and cruise altitudes) and
the low fuel consumption.
The New Cockpit Technology
The pilots also seem accepting of the new cockpit technology, they choose to use it, and they
find it helpful. Over 87% say they "like to use the new features of the 767 as much as possi-
ble"(#lE), 79% "use the automatic devices a lot because I find them useful"(#r10), although
3196 also agreed to some degree that they "use automatic devices mainly because the company
wants me to"(#35).
The iterns mentioned by the pilots are shown in Table 2. Particularly noteworthy is that the
general capabilities of the AFDS, F%1S/CDU, and EiCAS are mentioned, suggesting their gen-
eral agreement with the functions and implementations. Specifically mentioned items. such at
the map display and autothrottle, are also heavily used as seen in the Frequency-of-Use table
(in spite of their complaints about the implementation details of the autothrottle).
Ft%ork&aud
The pilot acceptance of the new cockpit technology, ,vith respect to workload reduction,
seems divided into two groups- those who say it reduces workload, and those who eel operat-
ing the devices creates a form of workload. This is reflected in the divided responses to
several questions: 47916 agi,° and 36% disagree, that "Automation reduces overall workload"
432} 531Y,, agree and 37% disagree that "automation does not reduce overall workload, since
there is more to keep watch over" #15; yet 79'16 agrce that "I use the automatic devices a lot
because I find them useful"(#10), regardless of any workload penalt y . A workload issue for
which there was a significant difference between captains and first officers seems based on
their different roles captains agreed more, on the average, and first officers disagreed more, on
the average, that "Automation frees me of much of the routine, mechanical parts of flying so I
can concentrate more on 'managing' the flight" (#24).
Equi ument Reliability
Pilot opinion about the reliability of the equipment was measured by some of the attitude
questions and roughly one-fourth of the pilots expressed some concern. Twenty percent of
the pilots disagree with the staternent "The new equipment is more reliable than the old"
(,-^29) (45% agreed with the statement, and 35`1'16 neither agreed nor disagreed). Similarly, 2790
agreed that they were "worried about srdden failures of the new devices like the FMS com-
puter and the CRT displays" OV-9), although the majority. 64%x, disagreed with the statement;
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and 26% agreed that they "have serious concerns about the reliability of this new equipment,"
and again the majority disagree] (6290.
Skill Maintenance
Maintenance of flying skills was a concern of the pilots. This appeared in the questionnaires
and in the pilot interviews. For example, 87% agree that they "hand-fly part of every trip to
keep my skills up" (#14), and 8046 agree that "pilots who overuse automation will see their
flying skills suffer" (#18). Interestingly, this concern for other pilots did not always carry
over to themselves because only 63 17c agreed that "I am concerned about a passible loss of my
flying skills with too much automation" 431). It is felt, however, that some pilots did not
agree with this statement because they do a lot of hand-flying.
The Frequency-of-Use table shows that the pilots, in general, hand-fly during transition and
enroute climb (especially at the lower altitudes, as observed on line flights) and in the termi-
nal area and final approach phases.
Features Disliked
There were few features or concepts that the pilots did not like, although there were features
whose implementation, they felt, n-eded improvement.
FMC Response Delay A large number of pilots felt that the response time for the Flight
Management Computer was excessive. 'When a specific instance was mentioned, it usually
involved complying with ATC requests while maneuvering in the terminal area. Although
some of the pilots have Iearned that they can "type ahead" of the FMC, that is, push the
appropriate buttons before the display requests the information, no pilot said he did this in the
terminal area ,vhen rapid, accurate responses were required, perhaps because it has the port-n-
tial for ce nmitting errors.
Mechanical/Electrical Checklists Two of the participating carriers used cardboard checklists,
and one used a mechanical checklist. Pilots of zbe first two carriers felt some aid would be
useful, especially as one pilot commented, it is difficult for a two man crew to get through a
checklist without some form of interruption. Many of the pilots felt that having thecheck-
list displayed on the EICAS would be beneficial. Perhaps so, but previous experiments (Rouse
and Rouse, 1980) have found that simply transferring material to the CRT does not neces-
sarily improve performance. It should be noted that the presence of the air-start envelope
parameters on the EICAS is not incons.stent with the concept of checklists on the CRT.
Location of Circuit Breakers and Spare Bulbs Several pilots commented on the inability to
reach circuit breakers and spare bulbs while remaining in their seat. This appears to be a
result of having to pull circuit breakers frequently during the early months of line operation
(to remove nuisance EICAS messages). Tlie need to do this has been decreasing as system
parameters are adjusted.
• Although the indicators have more than one bulb, one pilot reported havin g
 both bulbs in the
landing gear indicator burned out. The cockpit design philosophy clashes with the realit y of
line operation at this point: should the pilot continue the landing without leaving; his seat, or
-	 should he get up to replace the bulbs? Oaiv more experience can answer this question.
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Control Wheel Steer-ing This autopilot mode war, rarel y used by the pilots, and some said its
use was discouraged during training. Several reported in interviews that it was "rachety " and
"abrupt." My experience with pilots of other wide-body aircraft, who also seem to ignore
control wheel steering, suggests that there is more than rough performance behind this choice.
From a human-factois view, ONS has the disadvantage that it alters the stimulus/response
characteristics of the airplane, i e., control column movement to pitch-attitude response. This
has the potential for causing "mode" errors, where control movements are generated for one
mode, but the other mode is active. Discussion with pilots during the interviews revealed
another aspect: CWS, the analog of the pitch turn knob and/or vertical speed wheel of older
autopilots with a "manual" mode, does not give them the appropriate control for certain
phases of flight. In particular, it can be difficult to do the maneuvers the pilots wish, e.g.,
Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) maneuvering in the terminal area. This seems to be a
characteristic of all aircraft that have Mode Controi Pane'; and CWS. Consider the following
task: flying a VMC departure down a river that requires holding altitudes from time to time.
This is a case where it is desirea to regulate bank angle, instead of heading. This is easily done
with a turn knob (which controls bank angle) and vertical speed wheel wit'l altitude-hold
detent; it iv performed with one hand resting comfortably on the center console without look-
ing at the controls. It is difficult to do the same maneuver with Mode Control Panels that
have CWS; or heading select (this must be turned slowly to modulate bank angle) and a verti-
cal speed wheel, two separate wntros at arms' length.
Points of Confusion and Surprise
Th i s section will discuss the items reported by the pilots that relate to their operation of the
Autopilot/Flight Director/Autothrottle and the Flight Management System. The items
reported by the pilots about the operation of the CDU will be deferred to the section under
training.
Autothrottle-WS-SPD Irueraetions
About 25'0 or the pilots reported experiencing some confusion, or seeing others become con-
fused about the interaction of the autothrottles and autopilot. The source of this confusion
seems to be twofold.
First, the thrust elevator combination is a complicated interaction in any aircraft, and it
recalls the seemingly endless debate about controlling speed/altitude xvith throttle/elevator.
Obvicusly, both strategies are passible in climb and descent. (1 -here is agreement in some
regimes, such as constant altitude: elevator controls altitude, thrust controls speed.) When
these functions are automated, then, confusion and surprise are likely to follow if the pilots
are not aware of the modes actuall y in use. The now-classic situation for the 767, reported by
7%, of the respondents but experienced by almost everyone, is the situation of a high climb
rate close to the ground wrth a low altitude restriction. The autopilot "c..ptures" the selected
altitude about 1500 ft below that altitude, and switches from a mode where autothrottles are
holding climb thrust and elevator is controlling airspeed, to a mode where the throttle con-
trols airspeed and elevator controls altitude. It seems that just after altitude capture, an event
that is not noticed by the pilot tiyir.g because he is also looking outside, an ATC clearance to a
higher altitude is received. The rew altitude is selected, but instead of continuing the climb,
the aircraft levels off at the "o!—'" alti t ude and the throttles come back to maintain the previ-
ously set, but not yet changed bug speed (about 170 knots).
The second proposed, reason for the confusion of the autopilut/autothrottle interactions, is that
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this design has more capabilities than previous systems had. The autothrottle is almost always
"armed"; in this state, it can become engaged, e.g., by engaging the Si l l) mode, even though it
had been turned off with the throttle-mounted switches. Most pilots are used to autothrottles
that can only be engaged by an autothrottle switch. The ,csponse to the questionnaires and
experience in line observation suggests that there is some uncertainty about the conditions that
will allow the autothrottles to become engaged. ln addition, the throttles seem to come out of
idle during descent at times that the pilots feel are inappropriate.
Almost 1011/0 0£ the pilots reported some discomfort with the speed synchronization at the time
the Flight Level Change (F LCID mode is engaged; FLCH is designed to climb at the existing
IAS and climb thrust. The reason for the confusion seems to be that the SPD window shows
a value at the time FLCH is engaged, but this value has no bearing on FLCH operation since
the displayed speed automatically changes to the existing speed when FLCH is engaged. These
pilots felt that F1.Cli should hcld the speed displayed in the window, instead of the existing
speed. Perhaps the confusion arises because the other numerical parameters on the mode con-
trol panel (altitude, heading, even speed itself) operate as selected, not held, values.
It is difficult, from the available data, to allc^:ate the the 3Ut0'hTottleaut0pi1,1t confusion
among the several possible sources: system design, system implementation, training, and lack
of experience with the aircraft.
AFDS Turns "Wrong Way" or Does Not Capture
Nearly 20% of the pilots reported that at cne time or another, the autopilot either turned the
wrong way (usually on LOC intercept or when parsing over a wayiwint), or did not capture
the desired route or course. It is impossible from the reports received to attribute these
occurences to a lack of system knowledge, into-rest programming of the system, or equipment
malfunction. Even if' the pilots could be contacte.: for more information, it would be difficult
for them to recall all the pertinent detzils, and in addition, they may not know what caused
the anomaly. Sorne pilots,in their response to the question "Have you ever been surprised by
the automatics" answered in the arirmative, but said they ne ,,er had the time to determine
why.
One check airman suggested that an incorrect setting of the FRONT- CRS knob on the Instru-
ment Landing System (ILS) receiver ,vould cause the aircraft to turn the wrong way on LOC
intercept; the aircraft will start turning to the incorrect course, but the 11-5 signals will even-
tually cause the aircraft to track the localizer correctly. (One respondent mentioned he felt
the ILS receiver was too far from the normal scan pattern, and so an incorrect setting might
be missed.) There is also the pwibility, mentioned by another check airman, that the appear-
ance of the trend vector and the wind correction both contribute to a perception that the air-
craft is turning away from the hxalizer when it is not.
Reports of turning toward the approach course before reaching it may possibly be attributed
to capture of a localizer sidelobe. Reports of turning the wrong way after passing a waypoint
are hard to explain, except as postulated by one pilot, that perhaps the autopilot had been fol-
lowing the alternate route in the FNIS.
The causes of reported "failure" of the F.MS to capture a course are difficult to determine. It is
true that several preconditions must be satisfied before capture will occur, and it wa y noted
that not everyone was aware of these preconditions during the early phases of operation.
Still, equipment malfunctions or idios yncrasies cannot be ruled out as contributors to the
reported instances.
(^y
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Use of the Wrong Control
Pilots report using the wrong control knob, especially the dreading knob for the speed select
knob, and vice -ersa. This seems to occur during the first few hours on the airplane, and
disappears with exposure; there were no occurrences observed on the line trips.
Unelected Mode Changes
This phenomenon was reported 'oy 12% of the pilots, with all but two reporting a change to
vertical speed, and the others reporting a change to heading hold; both are the default modes
of the autopilot One incident (to be discussed later) was precipitated by such a change. Most
of these seem to have been of hardware, not operational, origin.
The level off at F1.180 was a singular report. Before this report was received, an engineering
pilot from a participating carrier noted that it might be possible to obtain such a level off if
the altimeter set knob v. as turned fast enough and far enough (as might happen while passing
through FL1 i;0) to cause the altimeter needle to move in the other direction.
Training
Introduction of a New Aircraft
The deinards placed on a training department during the introduction of a new aircraft are
grcat indeed. Their work starts long before certification, when the curriculum, siides, and
tapes are designed with the manufacturer. From the time spent in ground school when the
participating carriers we re training their initial crews, it was obvious that their Job was a
difficult one: by necessity, much of the information they needed was not available, an3 the job
of updating and inserting material is a never-ending one. This was compounded by the
change from a three man to a two man cockpit only months before certification. In addition,
tha training staff must respond to the experience of their line instructors.
Conversations with personnel involved in the transition training suggested that pilots felt the
material fell naturally into three topics: aircraft systems, the Autopilot and Mode Control
Panel, and the Flight Maragement System. In some sense, the same was true for the instruc-
tors and program developers. Both the pilots and instructors seemed more at home with the
aircraft systems, and these were learned without any appreciable difficulty even though they
sometimes contained more automation than previous systems; e.g., electrical source selection.
Some pilots and instructors had previous experience with mode control panels. Instructors
felt strongly that this previous experience made the transition easier for pilots with thia
experience.
The Flight Management System was entirely new to mast instructors and pilots. Although
some had prior experience with inertial navigation systems, the extensive capabi' 'its of the
FMS, andis integrated nature were completely new to most individuals. The following com-
a`	 ments, from the questionnaire, reflect this view.
" Tie FMS/CDU] system is complex and so completely different"
"I believe that the FMC was the most difficult to understand during ground school
and the first few periods in the simulator. My classmates felt the same way."
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I•'A1S1CIX1 Training
When asked on the questionnaire what material they wanted more or )ess of in trainim. the
strongest responses were requests	 i'for: more MS and CDU training (in general); more "hands
on" experience and training with the F\IS/(:I)U; more line-oriented CDU exercises; and less
nonoperational CDU material. These comments were confirmed by several line training pilots,
who, in the early phases, felt that the pilots arrived for line training with less than desirable
knowled ge and skills about the F\1S/0)U. No pilot who responded to the questionnaire had
training with a Flight Management Systems Trainer (1 MST), although t,vo of the airlines had
ordered such a device. Most of the F.%IS/CDU exercises were done on part-task, computer-
graphics terminals that illustrated the CDU key board and display. One airline attached a
CDU keyboard and display to the instructional station; another developed a multi screen
presentation to show. with slides, the mode control panel and the EADI/EIISI; the 1:\1SICDU
was depicted on an interactive computer graphics terminal.
The difficulties of conducting the FMS/CDU training seemed to have come from several
sources. First, there were many new concepts for the pilots to learn, e.g., navigating from
autotuned radios, not from a single radio. Second, although it is beyond the scope of this study
to identify the conceptual ly-Itifficult aspects of the system, the organization of the informa-
tion, and the naming conventions seemed to cause problems for some people. Third, and
perhaps most imporwnt, there was no training device that (from the pilots' view) was an ade-
quate simulation of the real FZIS/CDU; see the comments below on Computer-Aided Instruc-
tion.
Relevance of 1aterial
It can be seen from the responses that many of the pilots wished the, • had had more "realis-
tic" or line-oriented material to their FOSS/CDU exercises, and/or less material on features
that were nonoperational. This latter request seems to have arisen from the scheduled versus
actual in'roduction of e q uipment capabilities. A • first, the full capability FMS was to be
introduced, and trair:ng reflected this. Subsequent schedule slippage resultec in the initial
aircraft being delivered without a V\AV (Verucai \avigat.cn) capabilit y ; an "interim"
VNAV package was later Teieaseo, and the "full" V\AV cal.abi'ity is now- scheduled for
release in 1985. Thus, while training tradttionall 'y teaches some material before it is available,
the actual evolution of the FMS made the V\AV material particularly irrelevant in the
pilots' view.
-n addition to the material they received that they did not need, the pilots also felt that they
did not receive material they could have used. In some sense this is a continui.;g point of con-
.ention between line pilots and training departments. In the case of the FMS/CDU, pilots
revealed in interviews that they did not know how to deal with tasks such as crossing res-
trictions until afte. they started line nving. Although one can argue that these functions
would have been covered by the VNAV s ystem, pilots were not given an interim method and
sometimes did not receive the material in line training. Another item mentioned in the inter-
views, and the questionnaires, was a last-minute change in approach assigned by ATC; remov-
ing old information seemed to be as much of a problem as selecting the new approach from
the menu.
Computer-
 Aided Instruction—
Impressions and Lessons Learned
During the course of attending ground school at the three participating airlines, certain
impressions were obtained from first-hand experience and the comments of classmates. These
H
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impressions are being presented here, not to :imply that one training method or training device
• is better than another since many other factors (e.g., current stalbng levels, staff capabilities,
budgets, etc.) must be incorporated into a decision to use a particular training method or dev-
ice. Rather, they are given in the context of experimental data so that consideration to these
•	 points can be given in the future.
Realism A goo.: deal of CDU instruction was done with computer-graphics terminals. This
seems to be a reasonable teaching device for these tasks, since it is possible to create a good
representation of the CDU on the graphics terminal and the touch-sensitive screen allows
pilot actions similar to the real keytr„ard. The same computer system  and programs were used
by all three participating carriers and provided a basis for comparison.
The pilots felt the primary drawback of the device was the lack of functional realism, ie., at
a given point of the exercise, there was usually only one allowed s;,quence of responses,
whereas oa the real system, much more freedom is available. The trainee was never sure
whether the inability to do what he wanted to do ,vas due to his lack of understanding or a
limitation of the training device. It is recognized that this is a tradeoff involving program-
ming effort, but the frustration level of the pilots became high at certain times. One carrier
minimized this effect by having an instructor preser_t with each crew as they went through
the exercises. Before the pilot would start a sequence not allowed by the program, the
instructor would ask his intentions; if they wc:e inconsistent with the compute- program but
consistent with the real system, the instructor would say "Yes, you can do it that way on the
airplane but this program is looki-rg for anoth.r way, so do it this way...." This approach,
while requiring more instructional manpower, eliminated most of the frustration with the
training device.
In summarj, it seems important to have the training device respond as much like the real
device as possible without any artificial restrictions; this will remove the extra uncertainty in
the pilot's mind as he is learning, and will more quickly increase his knowledge of the system
as he explores and makes mistakes using the system. Manuals for complex systems rarely tell
what you cannot do.
Self-Paced Instruction One carrier had most of the Material on a computer instruction sys-
tem tied to a mockup of the relevant panels, with backlighting controlled by the computer
system. Conventional slides and audio tapes were also available to use as the pilots wished,
ground school instructors were available to answer questions, and meetings with rated
pilot/instructors were also used. The success rate on the oral exams was excellent. Originally,
the pilots Were instruct ,d to proceed at their o ,.vn pace through the computerized material
over a period of more than a week, and were not given feedback on their pace.
The pilots felt positively about the flexibility of scheduling their own time, but wanted feed-
back on their progress. Most pilots felt they hurried through the multiple choice questions
without much reflection. First, they did not know their progress compared to the norm, and
they thew that a significant effort would be required if they got behind. Second, withcut pac-
ing of any kind (as might come from an audio tape) the NASA observer felt, as did others,
that there was a tendency to "rush" through the questions, just to "finish." It seems that
daily goals and &Dme pacing (perhaps controlled by the student) would be useful.
Prompting and Feedback No computer instruction that was used by the NASA observer
allowed the student to control the level of prompting he received. At some point in the
learning process, students reached the point where they felt they knew enough to try a solu-
tion without any prompting or help, but they had no control over the prompting.
w
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Pmmpting in computer-aided instruction is similar to a "help capability on interactive com-
puter systems However, with these systems the user is allowed to select the level of "help"
he receives, of he receives help only when he asks for it. letting the user select the help level
is a feature th-t has evoived of ter many yeah of trying, "without success, to 'compute" the
level of help needed from'the user's previous experien_e and mistakes U%er-selected help level
is easier to program, and gives the user more control over the process; it would seem to be a
useful feature to have in these instructional programs.
The "three-screen" presentation developed by one airline was a useful step in integrating the
many interactions of the 17MS and autopilot systems. It was paced by an audio tape, and the
NASA observer felt that one feature, in particular, was extremely useful as a teaching
method. He knew enough to select the correct switch or knob to get through the exercise, but
the audio tape and displays pointed out the many ramifications and concomitant system
responses u those actions This was extremel y informative, and it would seem to be a useful
goal of any training s ystem dealin g with interactive, integrated systems, since it reinforces the
interactions and helps the student "build" his internal representation of the systems.
Lectures vs. Computer-Aided Instruction The training results obtained by the three carrier
and the data from the questionnaires, do not suggest a superiority in transferring knov.-ledge
for the lecture format or the (primarily) computer-aided instruction. No pilot answering the
questionnaire mentioned the positive aspects of flexible scheduling, although seveial students
mentioned it dLnng casual conversation. The 10 pilots who said the y wanted less computer-
aided instruction and more communication with instructors and classmates did not indicate
whether they would give up schedule flexibility for these missing features.
With the passage of time, it seems that the "pure" computer-aided instruction of one carrier
has evolved to a program containing more interaction with the rated instructors Morecver,
the airline that traditionall y used the lecture format has made extensive use of computer-
,	 1_
aided instruction for the first time. Thus it seems that all airlines are evolving tl.eir training
to a similar mix of computer-aided and face-to-face instruction.
Is There an I n formation Gap?
Observ, tions in ground school, &La from the questionnaires, and conversition vvith the system	 I
designers suggest that not all the desired information is malting its way to the line pilots, at 	 j
least during the introductory period.
During the third ground school attended by the NASA observer, the instructor was describing
the procedure to set up the FtiiS"CDC. He noted that it had been mysterious to him until he
"discovered" that, once on the initial page, "if you pros, the LINE SELECT key on the lower
right, it will lead you to the next logical ste p; it you want to back up. press the LINE SELECT
kev on the lower left". Eac., line key is labeled with a prompt for the appropriate "page ` in
the sequence. Prior to that time, the NASA observer had not remembered such a simple, logi-
cal "rule" m previous ground-school material, aithough it may have been there. It seems that
the system designers had intended that this technique be used, but it -,vas apparently dropped
somewhere along the way.
Another example involves the use of the F`MS'CDU in terminal area operations. A significant
number of pilots reTvrted on the questionnaire that they observed or experienced confusion in
responding to rapidiv changing ATC requests, and that the FMC responds too s!owly under
these conditio n& Discussion with the cockpit design team revealed that they had anticipated
the necessit y for rapid response, and had incorporated features in the design that would allow
pilots to imrnealately respond to ATC and defer CDU interaction. No explicit irstructions for
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this situation were observes in rn, and school, simulator :-essiom, or lire training flights, so it
may be that the recommecded pmo(tdures are not thing transmitted to the pilots. Alterna-
tively, the rcwrnmendations may may have bum tried, but found inade: urte.
It is interesting to note .hat hz)th of tLcse examples might be classified :s techniques, and tech-
niques are of great interest to th_ pi l ots and the designer This is esp"cal.ly true when com-
plex systems are involved because the right tmanique can greatly simp l ify n system. BW in
addition to techniques,, there is a urge amount of detailed materiai to be learned, and it is not
surprising that techniques and other concepts get "lust" so,newhere between the designers and
the pilots.
Com put er Concepts
Two of the questionnaire respcndents asked for some instruction on com puter concepts.
"Ground school should not t each just function of the CDu/computers, but a philo-
soph y of a)rnputer appincztions and pro€rammin; as applicable to our aircraft. This
was done when tte jnew iet turbine technology] B-707 was intrcxiuced in 195S.
Now that everyone is net oriented, this is not necessary. So today, the computer is
new and should be taught until ew'Tyone has the 'idea'".
"For these of us with no computer literacy (burn vlord) a 10 minute dissertation
on computer f uncucioina would help. Actually, just the thought that the damn
thing o:.lv does What it is told would save some errors."
Gr° pilot suggested an even broader scope.
"Front what I've seen R_- far, we could use a bit :acre emphasis on the 'tackground'
of some of the autorcat_s to better able a crew to understand what's happening or
not happening when things don't go as programmed..."
This type of instruction would certainly be consistent with the idea of creating a "szhema" or
framework about computers or automation, into which detailed information would more
easily be assimilated.
Eying The New Technclogy
Distractions
Several incident reports have a ppeared in the last 2 yrs that have a common theme. The
incidents involved transport aircraft with higher levels of automation. A typical scenario
proceeds as follovus the automatics are on and doing their assigned tasks mo-e than ade-
quately. Something happens to attract the crew members' attention; e.g., cr ying a navigation
fix, distractions from other crew members, etc. These distractions are typified by high levels
of cognitive (not perceptual) activi;-v. During this time, something happens to the operation of
the automatics (unselected rnode caange, unusual enviror- rental conditions) that requires
intervention by the crew. This need goes unnoticed because of the human tendency to deal
with One task at a time, and the high cognitive level of the "dMractor" task that consumes
most (if not zil) of the crews' attention.
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In some resYxts, this is exactly the tendency that must be overcome for a pilot to become
proficient at instrument flving. Ins2rurnent flying involves "learning" (1) to extract the neces-
sary information from a display as quickly as posible, and (2) not to fixate on one instrument,
but to sample all instrument.., with appropriate frequency. Instrument flying breaks do,,vn
when the pilot becomes "locked on" to an important piece of information and concentrates on
resolving one anomaly to the exclusion of the other parts of the task (e.g., neglecting airspeed
control during a difficult localizer intercept).
The experience with all aircraft ha v ing more sophisticated on-board devices leads us to suggest
that pilots must learn not to neglect the basic aircraft parameters. In other words, new scan
patterns must be developed, so that the pilot can deal with "distractions" as well as with
monitoring. During instrument flying, the pilot recei ves immediate feedback if he fails to
properly s.;an the instruments, since the aLrcraft will quickly deviate from the intended
course. Th pilot recei\es feedback about improper monitoring, however, only when the
automatics iail to operate as intended and when he is otherwise distracted. These two condi-
tions do not oft^n occur Lt the same tame, and so feedback on improper monitoring is rare.
Turn it of!'
On several of the line observ ation trips, the \.•SSA observer noticed the following. When
things did not go as planned, or when the pilot Naas "surprised" by the automatic.., (e.g_ the
early altitude capture with high rate of climb), the pilot would try to "program" his vcav out
of the anomalous zondttt;,n.'rhe situation would sometimes get worse and mote confusing, not
better. It seemed to the observer, on these tuas;ons, that the pilot would have made a
smoother and less distracting recovery by simply turning oft all the automatics and then
turning them on one at a time as needed. This strategy has the advantage that one immedi-
ately starts from a known condition, a hand flown airplane, and it is much easier to assess the
automatics as thev are engaged one at a time.
A captain involved in ::n incident spontaneously volunteered tha' his experience would not
have degraded to the level of an incident had he turned everything off when he became con-
fused and started "fresh
The tendency for some pilots to program a recovery, and not "turn it off." -was also confirmed
by interviews and discussions with line training pilots and check airmen. It does not appear
to be a fascination with the ne\a equipment. instead, it appears to be a habit learned during
simulator :raining ana most lire training, where the instructor's fob is to ensure that the stu-
dent learns the operation of the automatic equipment. It seems to be taken for granted that
the student knows there is an airplane behind the panel, and that the student knows when to
turn, it all off.
A questionnaire respondent felt the need for this training .then he asked for more training
"to turn o:T the auto system and take over manually at any place or time."
One line-training captain said lie used the following metaphor for new captains (it has some
disadvantages when applied to first officers!): think of the automatics as a crew member brand
new to the airplane: take over f rcm the automatics (i e., turn it off) anv t • me you would take
over from the new crew member.
u`
1
-34-
r 
tne
In summary, it appears that pilots need "turn it off- *_raining because of the tendency (perhaps
due to prior training) to program th-ir way out of an anomaly, but this often makes matters
worse.
l
r
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D"	 HUMAN FAM'ORS PRP''CIPLES
f . •	 CONFIRNIA'T.-IONS, A NEW P'rZI^NCIPLE, AND RESEARCH ISSUES
This section dc.-_-ribes the information gleaned from the study that has a bearing on the more
general human factors issues. These have surtaced as confirmations of existing principles, a
suggestion for a new principle, and topics for new research.
Confirmations
Mini?rdze Mental Operations
It has been propocetl that displays be designed to minimize mental operations or transforma-
tions (National Re`earch Council, 1982). This principle seems to have been confirmed by
several examnles of the B-767 aircraft. First, the map display gives an excellent representa-
tion of the horizontal situction, with minimal efort_ It is well received by the pilots and
heavily used, testimony in itself. (The ease of use and acceptance come as no surprise to the
military pilots and researchers who have been using map displays for more than 15 years.)
Another example of a displa y that minimizes mental operation is the altitude arc. This shows,
on the map display, the geographical position at which the aircraft will reach the altitude
selected on the mode control panel. This display eliminates the necessity to continually extra-
polate the flight path, by rules of thumb, to determine the position where the aircraft will be
at the desired altitude, Lem will the crossing restriction be met, or will the descent be too steep
resulting in wasteful ttse of fuel at low tdtitudm
Human Error
As presented in an earlier work (Wiener and Curry, 1980), one goal of automation is to elim-
inate Luman error. It was our contention that this is difficult, and automation will change
only the locus and type of human error. This principle has not been disproved by observation
of automation on the 5-767, since the operation of this aircraft has not been without incident
where human error was a contributing factor. 'There certainlyare not enough data, nor is it a
meaningful exercise, to determine if it is "better' or °worse" than other aircraft from this
standpoint-
The accident involving the Air New Zealand DC-10 in the Antarctic, in which ground-based
computzr errors had been made while creasing and distributing flight clans, may be a precur-
sor of this charge of locus of human error. There is scant evidence that such errors are occur-
ring with the current database or systems on the 13-767. There was orly one reported case of
an anomaly that ap parently involved a stored flight plan taking a 5C Lmile off-track excursion
to an obscure waypoint halfway through the cro&s-country flight plan.
P RECEDING PAGE BLANK NOT FIL-IfFD
—33-
A New Human Factors Rrinciple for Automated Systems
This section presents some information that appears to be worthy of consideration as a human
factors principle of automation.
Display Data, not Commands, for Control
There are three examples that suggest that displaying data, not commands, is more useful if
the pilot Iasi take appropriate control action without significant mental transformations of
effort. The first example is the Beads-Up Display (HUD) format proposed by Bray (1980),
where inertial flightpath ankle and scaled ILS raw data can be combined to allow easy ILS
tracking. The second example is the track-up map display and trend vector on the 767 (func-
tionally similar to the HUD format). The third example is the altitude arc discussed above. In
each case vehicle state information can be used to generate corrective, control actions with lit-
tle or no mental effort. 'Moreover, there is a great deal more flexibility in accomplishing flight-
path objectives with the data display compared to the command display.
Tlse issue seems to be this: A command-generation device needs to know the objectives of the
maneuver. These always have to be transmitted to the pilot or to the command generation
system, either impl
i
citly or explicitly. A data presentation, on the other hand, needs no such
-ransmission of goals, and it allows the pilot the flexibilit y to use more knowledge than would
be feasible to incorporate into the command venerator. Consider the following fictitious exam-
ple of how a pilot could use the altitude arc on the I3-767 map display: As they prepare to des-
cend into O'Hare, the pilot thinks, '1 know- A'1 TC is going to clear me to crass NXX at 11,000,
but it is Friday afternoon, the traffic is heavy, and 1 will probably get vectors off course for
spacing. if 1 keep it a little high, 1 will not get down too early even with the vectors; the
altitude arc will tell me how I am doing with the crossing restriction when 1 am off course.
If ATC doesn't give me rectors, I can push it over and know that I'll make the crossing res-
triction without any trouble."
Thus, dismlaying data (not commands) for control removes the necessity for the pilot and com-
mand gt erator to transmit and/or have common objectives, and it allows the pilot flexibility
to modify nis goals for existing conditions.
Research Issues
Displa y of Mode Target Values
It is not unusual to see a pilot "fighting" the automatics, especially autothrottles: he pulls
them back, they advance, he pulls them back again, and they advance once more. Obviouslv
there is a goal conflict. In a system with many complex interacting modes, it seems plausible
that explicit display of the goals or target valu,°s, as Well as the modes, would I p an aid in
interprcting the actions of the automatics. in an aircraft context, such displays :night take the
following form:
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with target values	 without target values
THR -1'L-250IN'TS
	
SPD
ELEV— I0,00OFr	 ALT HLD
or
THRTL=CL.IMB FPP.	 EPR
ELEV — V/S-15OOr—PAi	 V/S
It is true that aircraft autopilot and flight manal;ement systems usually display the target
values, but such data exist in a variety of places and not necessarily near the mode annuncia-
tions; moreover, mode annunciations do not always indicate who is doing what to whom. The
questionnaire rt3ponses suggest that pilo ts view the central location of mode annunciation on
the EADI as a positive feature; displaying the target values, along with the modes, has the
potential for further enhancing a rapid determination of system state.
Hwnan .behavior and Informant Processing for
Partial Awurnation and Monitoring
It was described earlier how pilots, as humans, tend to become distracted from the monitoring
task. The possibility of more and/or different training was raised as a possible remedy,
although it seems difficult to achieve consi-stent gains this way. It is recommended that the
influence of system design be investigated as an alternative method to alleviate the problem,
For example, lower-level advisory messages such as itgrading airspeed, rising engine, or cargo
temperature, may improve monitoring performance. The next section discusses  these possibili-
ties.
The human information processing requirements are different for manual fl y ing and flying
with automation, and a better understanding of the differences would be useful to designers.
For example., altitude is continually a;,arned when pilots manually fly the airplane; this in
turn, may serve as a reminder for the level-off altitude. There is no such persistent require-
ment when flying with automation, but one can argue that automation frees human resources
to allow better monitoring. If this is so, why have there bee-, so many spectacular lapses of
monitoring in over the years? Pilots feel that flying with partial automation is different, and
requires more monitoring. In one sense, it should be no different from monitoring another
crewmember as he flies, but pilots do not think of it that way. Why is this so? Research is
required to unravel these paradoxes
The tim"ependent aspects of * M onitoring also should be investigated. One may view flying as
the performance of many procedures that are triggered by elapsed time and events. The in-ro-
duction of automation introduces new events and alters the elapsed time of familiar events. It
is r-en more diriricult when the olxrators are not exactly sure what events may be triggered,
and by what- ]Moreover, the absence of an event is usually more difficult to detect than the
presence of an event, so detecting malfunctions from the symptoms is more difficult. ,System
designers need to know more about the useful time intervals of monitoring and other related
phenomena.
Alerting Systems
Direct information was obtained from crew members involved in two ircidents. Both discus-
sions revealed a need for more informatian about human interaction with alerting and warn-
ing systems.
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Treading The incident involving 2irspeed decay revea'.s the problematic nature of withhold-
ing all alerts until absolute necessary. Other incidents have also demonstrated this. It is
human nature to retain the previous hypothesis in spite of alarm indications to the contrary
(alarm systems are not always correct, after all). In man` instances it would seem that the
time it takes to come to a correct diagnosis; can, rnd has been, lengthened by this alerting phi-
losophy. A "trending" philcrophy would allow an assimilation of information over time, and
nav even prevent the situation from deteriorating to the point of normal alarm activation.
The drawback of a trendinf, philosoph y , o! course, is the possible existence of too many nui-
sance alerts. Thus, the research should explore trending philosophy and determine how to
display a large number of loi n -level advisory messages without being bothersome.
Perhaps the desi g n objective of any alerting system (.as told by one pilot) should be this: if the
pilot mentally says "thanks" to the system, it was a useful alert; otherwise it is not.
Quantity and Quality of Infornwzien The report of the crev,- member who experienced
engine spool-down raises the extremely difficult issues facing the system designers: what
information should be given to the pilot; hove' should it be presented; how should it be priori-
tized?
At least three research topics are suggested b y this incident, although the first is not nevi-. Is
there a logical and rational method, from both the designers' and pilots' view, to organize and
prioritize the informationl Second, is it worthwhile to have a sophisticated on-board syster.c to
propose hypotheses and actions to the crew? Lastly, would it be useful to have a datzba_se
query system to answer questions such at posed by this pilot. e.g., is the APU in a normal
start, or are the engines running? The interface to such a queTV system would be a design
challenge, indeed, but a query system might remove the primary need for prioritisation and
organization, of information. 	
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CONCLUSIONS
There are two points concerning the results that de-rve , particular emphasis. First, the data
were taken during the early introduction of the aircraft and the conclusions apply only to
that period. Second, although the &767 was the only aircraft in the study, discussions with
operators of the A310 (another new-tech no' ogy-cock pit aircraft) have confirmed very similar
experiences. 1"Lius, the following conclusions, while specifically mentioning the &767, are
likely to be valid for the introductory period of the A310:
1. Most of the pilots enjoy flying the B-767 more than they enjoy flying the older air-
planes.
2. T'ne pilots accept the ntw cockpit technology, and they choose to use it because
they find it useful.
3. The pilots are aware of the possible loss of flying skill with the presence of auto-
mation, and they hand-fly (usually with flight director) to prevent this loss. The
data collected in this study do not indicate any loss of skills.
4. The primary points of confusion or surprise were autothrottle/autopilot interac-
tions; the autopilot turning the 'wrong way" or not capturing the course; and
achieving desired results with the (F'%1SA _-DU).
S. The pilots felt training for the PAS/'CD IU could be improved, and they especially
wanted more "hands on" experience. More training on the mode control panel, and
more hand flying were also mentioned. 	 f
6. Information, especiall y %t chniques," may not always be getting from the system
designers to the line pilots
7. Flying any aircraft with sophisticated equipment and high levels of automation
allows distractions that cause a loss of monitoring performance.
8. Many pilots should bt trained to "turn it off' and not try to "program" their way
out of an anomalous situation.
9. These geld aata confirm some existing human factors principles, suggest a new
principle, and raise questions requiring further research.
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iTable I. Pilot Statistics
Number of 'um}.3?r of Totzl Time (hrs) 767 Time (hrs)
Airline
Captain
 of :'/(k
1'Lnimum	 !	 l.kdian	 Maximum lf^nimum	 Mcdwn	 Maximum
A 15 1	 7 8000.0	 14000.0	 23150.0 17.0	 60.0	 300.0
B 16 12 8500.0	 I	 1200().0 24000.0 20.0 113.0 300.0
C 30 22 420).0	 15500.0 _25000.0 5.0 iO3.5 1	 250.0
A11 Pilot 61 41 4200.0	 '	 13500.0 25060.0 5.0 100.0 300.0
1
I
I
i
}
PY,LCL'DING PAGE BL,%%, -K NOT F1LME'D
-41-
Tom)
Number of
Questionnaires
102
•	 .I
•°	 1
1
Table 2. Number of pilots mentioning items
on 102 questionnaires
Number of
Pilots
FEATURES LIKED
AFDS
20	 Autothrottle Concept/Speed Control
14	 AFDS Capabilities
10	 Takeoff Sio:ie and/or EEC
8	 Reduced Workload
6	 Altitude Capture/Select
E1-7S
42	 Display and clarity of information
22	 Map display
7	 Green Altitude Arc
5	 Wind Vector
4	 ADi Mode Annunciation
2	 Ground speed display
FMS/CDU
48	 System capabilities
2	 Route display
EICAS
35	 Quality and quantity of information
6	 Engine limits and numbers
3	 Monitoring capabilities
FEATURES MISSING OR NOT LIKED
20	 FMC response delay
'	 7	 Want electrical/mechanical checklists
7	 Circuit breasers and spare bulbs not within reach
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Table 2. Number of pilots mentioning items
y	 on 102 questionnaires (con)
Total
Number of
Questionnaires
102
Number of
Pilots
POLv'TS OF CONFUSION OR "SURPRISE"
25	 Autothrottle-V/S-SPD Interaction
20	 AFDS turns "wrong way" or does not engage
19	 Using wrong control (especially HDG/SPD)
12	 Unelected mode change (10 to V/S, 2 to HDG HLD)
11	 Removing route discontinuities and extra information
11	 Track/heading on map display
9	 Speed sync at FI.CH engagement
7	 Early altitude capture at high climb rate
7	 AFDS-MCP mode (general)
6	 F%lS/CDU useage (general)
6	 Simultanecus speed brakes and landing flaps
5	 Changing approaches on FMS/CDU close-in
3	 No aural trim indication
3	 Holding with FMS/CDU
3	 Map drift
2	 Use of I routes in FMS/CDU
2	 High bank angles at LOC capture
2	 Defining waypoints from station
I	 Unelected level-off at FL180
TRAINING
4	 Satisfactory as is
More:
25	 FVIS/CDU
22	 "Hands on" CDU experience
12	 Hand flying
8	 AFDS-MCP training
7	 Practical, line-oriented CDU exercises
6	 Aircraft systems
3	 Single engine simulator experience
Less:
10	 Computer aiCed instruction
7	 Three-man simulator
3	 nonope-ational FMS material
2	 Phase-of-flight presentation
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Table 3. Statements Used for Pilots' kesponses
1. 1 can fly the airplane as smoothly and safely by hanc' as with automation.
2. Younger pilots catch on to automation faster than older ones.
3. Flying today is more challenging than ever.
4. The Fh1S/CDU is easy to use to normal line flying.
5. 1 think they've gone too far with automation.
6. Autoland capability definitely enhances safety.
7. I spend more time setting up and managing the automatics (such as the F41S/CDU) than
I would hand-flying or using the old style autopilots.
8. I like to use the nev3 features of the 767 as much a_s possible.
9. I am worried about sudden failures of the new devices like the r• nv1S Computer and the
CRT displays.
10. I use automatic devices a lot because I find them useful.
11. I enjoy flying the 767 more than the older aircraft.
12. I always know what mode the Autopilot/Fli-ht Director is in.
13. I can fly as efficiently as the FMS without its help.
14. 1 hand-fly part of every trip to keep my skills up.
15. Automation does not reduce workload, since there is more to keep watch over.
16. 1 can find the exact location of important controls and switches without any Lesitarion.
17. Automation is the thing that is going to turn my company •hound and make it
profitable again.
18. Pilots who overuse automation will see their skills suffer.
19. The AD] and EIISI displays are always leg ible and easy to read.
20. 1 am favorable toward automation in the cockpit - the more the better.
21. Flying the 767 is definitely easier than flying other aircraft.
22. Setting piloting priorities with this new cockpit technology is no more difficult than in
our other airplanes.
23. We should have full autothrottles on all the com pan y 's aircraft_
24. Automation frees me of much of the routine, mechanical parts of flying so 1 can con-
centrate more on "managing" the flight.
25. 1 have se^tus concerns about the reliability of this new equipment.
26. Sometimes what the automatics do or don't do takes me b y surprise.
27. It is easier to cross-check the other pilot in the 767 than in our other airplanes.
28. Too much automation can be dangerous.
29. The new equipment is move reliable than the old.
30. It is important to me to fly the most modern plane in the company's fleet.
31. 1 am concerned aL-)ut a possible loss of my flying skills with too much automation.
32. Automation reduces overall workload.
33. 1 always feel 1 am ahead of the airplane.
34. Hand-flying :s the part of the trip I enjoy most.
35. 1 use automatic devices mainly because the company wants me to.
36. The FMS/CDU requires little or no in-fiight button-pushing b e low FL-180.
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Table I Pilot Opinion Summary (% respon ,,^rs by category) (con)
Y
STA,re'^NI-
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—
STR0NCYL i
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—
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DISAGR19:	 I	 DISA( RII
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37
38
3
26
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11
I	 39
62
29
3
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'.r	 17	 3^
35	 15	 19
17	 S _	 27 ^—	 3^
36	 !	 1 '	 i	 15	 6
35	 15	 i	 14
36	 l	 o	 I	 4	 0
16	 10	 28	 36
I	 40	 1)	 ;	 6	 ;	 0
24	 7	 0
32	 !	 5	 1	 28	 3
17	 1S	 I	 40	 23
24	 !	 4	 7	 2
i5 22 3 1 	 1 0	 23
16 29 I	 29	 I	 10	 31	 ?
17 6 T	 15	 18	 i	 211
iE 48	 i	 32	 0	 12	 3
19 51	 28	 '	 S	 1	 13	 3
20 IS	 44	 1=	 1	 17	 !	 6
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13	 !	 33	 f	 '4	 25	 I	 6
19	 32	 ill	 I	 32	 8
23 16 21	 1	 41	 I	 15 8
24 i9 1	 42	 1	 Ic	 19 5
25	 I 4	 22	 I	 13	 30 32
26 '.0	 52	 !	 S	 1	 22	 8
27 11	 26	 ..1 27	 7
28 11 34	 2;4 17	 I	 10
29 13 32	 I	 - 21 0
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I	 33 21 40	 IC I	 28 1
34 22 3S 10 6
35 6 25	 27 30 13
36 3 13	 1	 6 24 55
1
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Table 4. Contingency Table Comparison, of Responses to Statements
(agree/disagree) and Airlines
Statements on v. htch there was agreement (p > 0.72)
Probability	 Statement number I 	 Statement
	
0.93
	 2	 I Younger pilots catch on to automation faster than old-
er ones.
	
0.95
	 5	 1 think they've gone too far with automation.
	
0.82	 11	 I 1 en joy flying the 767 more than the older aircraft.
	
0.80	 I	 13	 1 can flyer e nciently as the FMS without it.,; help.
	
0.72	 20	 1 am favcirab:e toward automation in the cockpit-the
more the better.
Statements on which there Nvas disagreement (p <0.05)
0.013 1	 1 (	 I can fly the airplane a, smoothly and safely by hand
as with automation.
0.015 4
1
I	 The IZiS/CDU is easy to use in normal line flying.
0.037 9 1 am worried aNnit sudden failures of the new devices
E
i	 like the F IS Computer and the CRT displays.
0.048
	 i 14 I hand-fl y pa.-: of every trip to keep my skills up.
0.025 16 I can find the exact location of important controls and
switches witho it any hesitation.
0.017	
I
21 Flying the 767 is definitely easier than fl y ing other
aircraft.
i
0.041 26 Sometimes what the automatics do or don't do takes
me b-,.surprise.
li 0.025 29	 I The new equipment is more reliable than the old.
1	 I
i
1
/
i
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Table 5. Cantingenc
First Office:
Statement_~ on w
Probability
0.85
Statement
number
1
O.99 4
0.87 10
0.88 12
0.85 13
0.91 19
0.90 21
'	 1.00 22
0.87 23
0.85 32
0.84 34
y Table Comparisons of Captains Versus
• s and their Response to the 36 Statements
hich there was agreement (p > 0.80)
Statement
I can fly the airplane as smoothly and safely by hard
as with automation.
The F\IS/CDU is easy to use in normal line flying.
1 use autorr:atic devices a lot because I find them use-
ful.
1 alwa ys know what mode the Autopilot,-Flight
Director is .n.
I can 8y as efficiently as the F%IS without its help
The AD] and El1Si displays are always legible and
ea-sv to re:,d.
Flyirg the 767 is definitely easier than flying other
aircraft_
Setting piloting priorities with this new cockpit tech-
nology is no more dit cult than in our other airplanes.
%Ve should have full autothrottles on all the
company's aircraft.
Automation reduces overall workload-
Hand-living is the part of the trip I enjoy mos
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y Table S. Contingency Table Comparisons of Captains Versus
First Officers and their Respor_se to the 36 Statements (con)
Statements on which there was disagreement (p <0.05)
Ptababilit_y {	 Statement	 Statement	 Reasons
numtr r
	0.047	 6	 Autoland capability	 Captains agree more, FOs
definitely enhances safety.	 disagree more
	
0.043
	
24	 Automation frees me of	 Captains agree more, FOs
much of the routir.c-	 disagree more
mechanical parts of flying
so I can concentrate more
on "managing" the fight.
r ^•
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Table o. Factor Analysis of Pilot's Responses to 36 Statements
Factor Loading Statement number I Statement
0.815 25 1 have serious concerns about the reliability of' this
new equipment.
0.806 9 1 am worried about sudden failures of the new devices
like the FNIS Computer and the CRT displays.
-0.661 29 The new equipment i^ more reliable than the old.
-0.525 22 Setting piloting priorities with this new cockpit tech-
nclv ,^ v is no more dithcult than in our other afrt;lanes.
0.732 13 I can fly as ?fficiently as the FMS without its help.
0.727 l 1 can d}• the airplane as smoothly and safely by hand
as with automation.
-0.534 24 Automation frees me of much of the routine, mechan-
ical	 parts	 of	 flying	 so	 I	 can	 concentrate	 more	 on
"managing' the flight.
0.462 35 1 use automatic devices mainly because the company
wants me to.
' 0.458 7 1 ;rend more time setting up and managing the au-
tomatics (such as the F%IS %CDU) than I would hand-
fiying or using the old style autopilots.
-0.447 32 Automation reduces overall workload.
0.409 34 Hand-fiving is the part of the trip I enjoy mast.
0.327 5 1 think they've gone too far with automation.
1r
1
.	 I
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Table 6. Factor Analysis of Pilot's Responses to 36 Statements (con)
Factor L	 dint Statement number I	 Suitement
0.802 16 I I can find the exact location of important controls and
switches without an y hesitation.
0.768 12 1	 always	 know	 what	 mode	 the	 Autopilot/Flight
Director is in.
0.727 33 I alava`s feel I am ahead of the airplant.
0.497 10 I use automatic devices a lot because I find them use-
ful.
0.483 4 Tt:e FMS/CDU is easy to use in normal line flying_
0.804 14 I hand-fly part of every trip to keep my skills up.
0.753 18 Pilots who overuse automation will see their flying
skills suffer.
0.720 31 I am concerneU about a possible loss of m^ flying skills
%vi*h too much au^onnation.
0.407 28	 Too much automation can be dangerous.
0.729 30	 It is important to me to flY the most modern plane in
the company's fleet.
0.716
f
11	 I en joy fiving the 767 more than the older aircraft.
0.549 20	 ( 1 am favorable toward automation in the cockpit - the
more the better.
0.489 8 1 like to use the new features of the 767 as much as
possible.
_	 0.458 6 Autoland capability definitely enhances safety.
0.799 36 f The 1 MS/CDU requires little or no in-flight button-
pushing below FL180.
0.68 27 It is easier to crosscheck the other pilot in the 767
than in our other airplanes.
-0.379 l5 Automaticn does not reduce workload, since there is
more to keen v., tch e%,er.
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Table 6. Factor Analysis of Pilot's Responses to 36 Statements (con)
Factor I adinoyStatemmt number Statement
0.701 23 We	 should	 have	 full	 autothrottles	 on	 all	 the
company's aircraft.
0.515 21 Flying the 767 is d;finitely  easier than flying other
aircraft.
-0.45126 Sometimes what the automatics do or don't do takes
me by surprise.
0.448 17 Automation is the thing that ;s going to turn mv com-
pany around and maize itnrofitable agair,.
0.645 19 I The ADl and EHSI displays are always legible and
easy to read.
I
OS48 2 1 Younger pilots catch on to automation faster than old-
er on—s._
0.496 3 I Flying tcdav is more challe^inn than ever.
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Appendix A
Questionnaire Distributed to
Participating Pilots
PRECEDING PAGE i.^. A T IC NOT FIL?viT_r7
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r764H^_'`G:ziliG-spa_ :^ .- ^^t• . r _
Pfr,-russ fill In •ha lrrfonrt rion below, and titsrt IN,c'ce-od with the rernain!ng parts.
VJ"n-en you are fin,z4-Ktd, return to oz.ire booklet in tem mwelape to:
Dr. 112in Curry
NASA Pm e3, 21-9-3
Mioff tt FIaId, CA 9,1035
iD cade
You. Position :	 captain	 _Fir3t Offloer
Today's Date
Date ^^ou firdshed
Ilm training:	 —1-1
Total hours flying time
To,al I;ours In 767 :
Drys since you last
flow tim 7G7 :	 --
^r
i
pl
'I	 ,
Y	 FREQUENCY OF USE
The purpose of this part is to determine how frequently you use certain features
of the 7G7 during variou3 phases of flight.
Enter the percent of your lezz on which you use the particular feateu a for each
ph- as a of flight. For examq)le, if you always use auto►hrottle on takeoff, then
enter 100 in the row for Auto 'throttle and the Takeoff column; if you use
autot;hrottle for takeoff only on 1/3 of the legs, then enter 33 in the Takeoff
column
If it is possible to use a feature In E particular phase of flight, but you never use
it lwacau.se of company procedures, FARs, or your own preference, then enter 0.
If it is iMDossible or doesn't make sense to use a feature during a particular
phase of fli ght, e.q., "Step Climb" during the takeoff phase, then cross out tl at
"ceii" of the table with a large X.
The last colt 	 is provided for any comments you may have about why you do
or do not uze the feature, aryJ/or 1tow you uze it.
i
i
ID Code
For ewh phase-of-fiight cok nn In tfe table, ender the percent of your legs on which) YOU use Ilse fea-tlue
da=ibW on the 100 If it Is impossible or cioem't make se-ne to use the fez TtUre in a partiaAar plisse of
flight, then cross out ttiat "cell" in the taUe.
FEATURE
UC^i PHASE OF FT	 j
COM fA EINT
I
Tr,3ceoff ^Frar: 'tion
to 10Oo ,
	
Errou:
AGL	 limb
Cruse escent
Cruse to
0, a30
,^
Terminal IFinal Ap-'
Area	 proach
I
Landng
AUTOPILOT
Ctd! D
CWS I^
Hand no FD I
Fly with FD
MCP FEATURES
Ver tical  Spend
Bark limit--Auto i
Bcr& limit--man I I	 ^I _^
LHAV	 !^ I I
VNAV I I
FL CH
Ap^x'oadi Mode
A u^oI and I
AUTOTHROTTLE
	
Ij I I _1
DI SPLAYS
Map mode
I j
VOR/F_S mode	 I^
Altitude (Green) Arc
--F73 S/CDU
Direct/Ir*.tercept
I I
Step Climb
FUC mode j
VOR marugl tine
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i
.	 ID Code
For each w! win In tho table, enter the r ercent of yo.- la-M on W!idh you irA! the fen Itiro
da-=:hsd on tha Irft. If is Impo3^>ible or doe:,mn't make --.vroe to tze the foa- e !:t e particLAar phase of
flight, then cross out that "cal" in the :ble.
PPA.SE Or FUGHT
c	 I, akeotf toTra^at!on I	 Cruise Descorrt 	 Termiroil	 Fin&! Ap- I LarKIngFEATURE !1D00 AGL, Yti Erroute
1	
(Climb i(Cru^uo Area	 i FxoachI10,0013
i	
COMMENT
MSL)
--AUTOPILOT	 I
Harks fly--no FD
	 I	
!
'	 J
Hcil fly—with FD
	 I
~CW S
Verticr^A Spaad
Sark lima--Auto 	 I)	 I	 I	 C,
Bank I I m! t--m L"d as^-
L-NAV Gov
V UA V --
FL CH.	
^C,
A pproech M o ck	 I I
	 0',	 ^ I	 I
Auto!and
---	 I I	 ^-	 ^~U~	
-AUTOTl2 0 :•l LE	 a fC	 I	 ^^
DISPLAYS
	 {^^
Map mode	
Fi	
'
VOR/ILS r7sode
Altitude (Green) Arc j	
`^~^	
f—	 I	 I	 —
FP1 S/
UirecInt/ *.urcept
t/
Step Climb	 I	 ^-
FIX mode	 I
VOR man-rA ttr.-3
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' 	
e>	 GENERAL QUESTIONS
1. Have you seen any ccnfusion or incorrect operation on the part of other
crew members in the u3c of these 767 systems? If so, what?
AFDS (MCP) and
Aut othrott l e
ADI/EHSI
FM,S/CDU
EICAS
2. Have you ever been "surprised- • by the actions of the automatics, that is,
they did or dill not do something you expected? If so, pease explain.
3. Are there ainy features about the systems below that you are not quite sure
aboui, or that you do not feel comfortable with? Please descibe.
Feature r,.)t	 What do you think
sui a of
	
the problem is?
AFDS (NICP) and
Autothrottie
.	 ADl/EHSI
FMS/CDU
EICAS
d
G. `JVhet feature or capability do you like most and like least about each of the
following systems?
Feature liked	 Feature liked
the most	 the least
AFDS (.MCP) end
Autot_hrottle
ADI/EHSI
FMiS/CDU
E ICI AS
5. If you could make any changes in the cockpit (layout, add or delete features,
llghtiny, ventilation, noise, etc.) what would they be?
6. What area(s) should receive more or less emphasis in training? (Consider
both around and simulator.)
59
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7 67 PILOT CIUESTIC"NNAIRE
r:
The following statements describe reactions to flying, new cockpit technology,
and 'Zh-e 767 egipcnent. For each item, irricate how much you agree or disagree
with L`:e statenveris, as ti\—y refer tr your aif, by circlincl the appropriate fetter
on eachh scale.
ANSWER QUICKLY: YOUR FIRST IMPRESSION IS THE BEST. Remember to
answer every question even if you are unsure.
Feel free to ad-d any comments after you have circled all the answers.
1. 1 can fly the airplane as smoothly and safely by hand as with automation.
A B C D E
stmrrtY :iictniy r*^thcr agree slightly strordy
agee agree nor disagree dsagee dsaoree
2.	 Yo linger pilots catch on to autcmLtion faster than older
A B C D E
strorr4y siigghtiy natt" ag cue slic#Ydy stror4y
wee agree ror cisaqvee dsagee dsagee
3.	 Flying today is more challerging than ever.
A B C D E
stronc$y flighty net-k-- Agee slightly strorKjy
agree epee nor d sag ee dsagree disagree
4. The i rwIS,/CDU is easy to use in normal line flying
A B C D E
stronciY slic"Y nether agee slightly strorxjy
agree agree rur disagree dsagee dsagee
5.	 1 thank they've gone too far wide automation-
A B C D E
stronjy slightly np-,^ her agree slightly strorKjy
epee agree ror di sagree dsag©e d sag ee
r
60
6. ALtolond capability definitely era'ianecs safety.
A s C D E
strorxjy slirzptly neither ayee slightly strcnc^y
wee . agr(-,-- nor alsacgree dsagree dsagree
7.. 1 sp--M :core time setting ups ar^d mzmaglrK. the automatics (such as the
FNIS/CCM) th-an I X^JOUld hand flying or using the old style autopilots.
A B C D E
stroirjy slimy noitf)er cgee slightly strox-4y
eo• ee agree nor c &, -	 ee dsaree CB,6giree
S. l like to use the new featr.res of the 767 as much as possible.
A B C D E
strongly yi	 r"dy neit-ser sgree sligh'dy stror4y
agree agree ror dsagree dsa_cyoe dsaaree
9. 1 am worried about sudden failures of the new devices like the FMS Com-
puter and the CRT displays.
A B C D E
stror ,$y SI;(MY rpettvy agee ighdy strongly
wee agree nor dsagree dsagree diszUree
10. 1 use automatic devices a lot because i find them useful.
A B C D E
stroru$y SIiCgtty nd-tiar rproe slightly storc^y
g7ae acs'ee ror dsagree dsagree dsacgree
11. 1 enjoy flying the 767 more than the older aircraft.
A B C D E
Strorxjy slightly nei t ier agree sfi", Y strotmy
Cgree agrce ror dsagree dsagoe ds,,,,T ee
12. 1 always know what mo:iL tha Autopilot/Flight Director is in
A B C D E
strondy sli3Tdy neiti-Kr agree siigi•ttiy stronc'y
v,gree agree nor dWe° dsagree dsagree
13. 1 can fly as efficiently as the FrOS without its he!p.
A B C D E
strorxjy slimy na t+ier agree slighly stroryty
a&-ee agree nor cisagree dsagree dsa^Tee
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1
o4. 1 nand fly pint of every trip to kt-ep my skins Lip.
A B C D E
stroojy siigltiy ie t	 agree sLronyi
agrd-.-- egret- nor disagree cti:agree ctsag ee
16.	 Automation does not reduce worklo&J, since there is rrore to keel_ ­D4ch
ever.
A B C D E
strorP4y sfighby neittr r agree slicidly strorxjy
agree agree nor d sacf ee disagree dsagree
6.	 1 can find the exact location of important controls and switches wit`-out any
hesitation.
A B C D E
stromjy slightly rather agree sliclitly stromiy
agree a ree r- ,r dsay ee dsag^r dsayyca
17.	 Automation is the thing that is gong to turn my company around are: rci:ce it
profitable again.
A B C D E
strorxiy dightly natt'er ag r ee -iicf,tly stronjy
agee agree nor csagree dsagree dsag' ee
18. Pilots who overuse automation will see their flying skills suffer.
A B C D E
strorxgty slightly neit-er agree digTtly strop,-ly
agree agree nor disagree disagree disagree
19. The AD! and EHSI displays are always legible and easy to reaci.
A B C D E
strorv,ly slightly natt" agee slightly stron4y
agree agree nor dsWee dsagree disagree
20. 1 am favorable toward automation in the cockpit - the more the better.
A B C D E
strongly sli5htiy neither agree siic#rtly strongy
Berta agree nor dsagree disagree dsagree
21.	 Flying the 767 is defini_ely easier than flying other aircraft.
A B C D E
strongly slightly neit'ier agree slightly strorxjy
ag r c^v_- agree rar dsagree diskgree dsac-ee
1I
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22. Setting piloting priorities ^^rith ',hi	 new cockpit tec.F.noloV i	 no more diffi-
ctg t than in our other airp!araes.
A B C D E
strorkjy slIg'rtly naithsr agee dight1y strongly
£gee ajes nor cissgces dsagree ds-a4ree
23. We 5.hoLdd have full autethrotties. on all ttte corT pany '3 aircraft.
A B C D E
strorrjy si!ighUy "then uge3 ,Aightiy stroncly
agco free ror cfsWu-- dsagree dsagee
24. Automation frees me of much of the roLeire, mechanical parts of flying so I
cz-n concentrate more can "managing" ilQ flight.
A B C D E
strooy slightly neither agree dighdy sftrongiv
agree agee wr dsagree dsagree d sag ee
25. 1 have serious concerns about the reliability of this new equipment.
R B C D E
strorxjy dighR y ndther a!xea slightly stmryjy
wee agee nor dsa,7ca cisagrera dsagree
26. Sometimes ghat the automatics do or don`t do takes me by surprise.
A B C D E
stronjy slighty neither ages slimty strorrjy
awee agee nor dsagree dsagea dsagee
27. It is easier to cross-whack the other pilot in the 767 than in our other air-
ps.
A B C D E
strork3y s;igh`iy nalther agree s.ightiy strong!y
ague wee nor dsagee oesagree dsagree	
i
28. Too much wtomation can be dangerous.
A B C D E
strorgy dightly neither acTee slightly stronijy
V,gP-s agree no  dsagre-a dsagee clsagree
29. The raw equipment Is more re'.i?ble than	 old.
A B C D E
strorejy -,Jlo rdy neither agree siigtr~Jy strorKjY
wee age-- rpr dsagree dsa-gee dsagree
i
Mme:_N `.
	 '•L. F^ "^ .._; .:^ '`' —
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30. It Is Important to me to fly the most modern plane in the company's fleet.
A B	 C D E
strote^y sii;^rtly	 rwRhar Woe lightly strong!y
I agoe e,73e	 nor dsagrce dsagree dsagree
y , 	 31. 1 am concerr.ad Lbout a possibie loss of my flying skills with too much auto-
rnatior-
A B	 C D E
stro^c:y sl;c	 y	 nuttier agree slighhy s^•on.c$Y
agrGe agree	 nor dsagree dsagree dsagree
32. Autormation reduces overall workload.
A B	 C D E
stror	 y si.ctt. y	 neither acsee slimy strongly
ay ee agree	 nor dsgee dsagree dsagree
33. 1 always feel I am ahead of the airplane.
A B	 C D E
--tro1 .4y sii Olt y	 naither agree slightly stror4y
&gee aaee	 nor dsagree dsagree dsag•ee
34. HaM fry ing is the part of the trip l enjoy most.
A B	 C D E
strorr3'y s:icttly	 nutter agree si i ghtly str'oncjy
agr ngree	 nor dsagree dsacgee dsagree
35. 1 uzze automatic devices mainly because the company wants me to.
A B	 C D E
stror"y Silg •ily 	 mitt	 agcy Sti-Y stroVy
ague wee	 ror dsagree dsagree dsagree
36. The FMS/CCU requires little or no in-flight button-pushing below FL180.
A B	 C D E
strorgiy slightly 	neither agree 9i"Y strord y
agree sgree	 nor dsagree dsag; ee dsagree
i
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Appendix 3
Frequency-of-Use Table
The frequency of use table was distributed in two fortes k.,ee Apperdix A) because of some
ambiguities in the instructions and some apparent inconsiste. ties to the response to one table.
The second version of the table attempted to resolve the zmbiguities by explicitly showing the
four mutually exclusive AFDS modes: CMD (command), MS (control wheel steering),
Hand-fly with FD (Flight Director), and Hand-fly without FD. Both versions had these
instructions in common:
For each phase-of-flight column in the table. enter the percent of your legs `on
which you use the feature described on the left_"
For Loth versions, the pilots (correctly) interpreted the instructions in one of two ways.
About 7591b of the pilots filled in numbers for which the percentages add up to 100 (the 1009"0
group), and the remaining pilots used numbers that added up to more than 1(XYto (the greater-
than-100"Yo grou p ). The ambiguity arises because more than one feature can be used during a
particular phase of flight. In fact, several picots reported (in the margins) hand-flying to
1600() ft and then engaging the CMD mode. The 16090 group reported this as 2590 hand flying,
and 759'6 CMD, whereas the the other group would report this as 1000 for each feature in
this phase of flight. Because of these different reporting styles, the two groups (the 10000 and
greater-than-100'0) have their use of the autopilot modes reported separately.
The data were reduced to a common format for the autopilot use as follows: for the first ver-
sion of the table that did not explicitly contain a CMD row, a CMD row was created by
adding up the use for the other three modes and subtracting the sum from 100: thus this
should be considered a lower bound to the use that would have been reported had the CMD
row been in the .able.
The results are summarized in Table B. Since percentages are being reported, there is a sub-
stantial "floor" and "ceding" effect, and a traditional measure of means and standard devia-
tion are meaningless Each cell in the table reports the quartile scores (Ql, Q2, and Q3) and
the number of valid responses in each cell; these quartile points divide the valid responses into
four equal sized groups; thus, one-quarter of the responses fall below the level in the Q1 row;
one-half fall below the level in the Q2 row; and three-quarters of the responses fall below
the level in the Q3 row. For example, in the greater-than-ICO?c group, there were 23 valid
responses for the "hand-fly with flight director" mode during the "Transition and enroute
climb" phase of flight: one-quarter of the responses (about 6) fell below 52.5 9'o; one-half of
the responses (about 12) fell below 9090; and three-quarters of the responses (about 18) fell
below 93.759o. Linear interpolation is used on the percent cf legs and the number of responses
to calculate the quartile points.
Table B. Frequency of Use
PHASE CF FLIGHT
'a I
Takeoff	 Transi-	 Cruix	 Descent	 Tcrmi	 Final	 Land-
FEATURE 10 1000	 tion	 &	 (Cruise	 nal	 I	
.AR-	 irk
AGL	 En-	 to	 Area	 proach
route	 10,000
I
Climb	 AiSL)
GRF._ATER_THAN 1(	 GROUP_
Q1 I	 0.0 52-5 100.0 I	 82.5 50.0 25.0 0.0
Q2 0.0 90.0 100.0 95.0 75.0 50.0 10.0CMD Q3 0.0 93.75 100.0 I	 100.0 875 50.0 20.0
N I	 18 23 23 23 23 23 22
Q1 0.0 0.0 0.0 I	 0.0 0.0 0.0
f
0.0
r-"Is	
Q2 0.0 0.0
0-0 0
0.0 0.0 0.0
Q3 0.0 0.0 . I	 .0 0.0 0.0 (	 O.0
N 1	 27 29 28 29 29 29 26
Q1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 I	 0.0 0.0HAND Q2 0.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 17.5 17.5 10.0FI_Y NO Q3 25.0 50.0 17.5 45.0 40.0 i	 40.0 32.5FD
N 25 25 23 24 24 24 20_
Q1 68.75 10.0 0.0 5.0 20.0 50.0 50.0
HAND	 2 100.0 50.0 2.5 20.0 60.0 75.0 82.5
FLY:FD	 Q3 100.0 94.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 88.25 98.0
4 29 28 26 26 26 25 i	 22
100% GROUP
Q1 OA	 20.0	 96.5	 1	 80.0	 50.0	 20.0	 0.0
Q2 0.0	 55.0	 100.0	 90.0	 67.0	 +	 40.0	 5.0
'MD IQ3 0.0	 90.0	 1W.0	 100.0	 82.5	 !	 50.0	 10.0
N 53	 70	 68	 I	 67	 68	 i	 67	 65
Q1 0.0 0.0 0.0 I	 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
"WS	 Q2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0iQ 0 (1 0 0.0 0 0.0 0N 64 1	 70 70 I	 69 70 I	 70 65
Q1 0.0 0.0 0.(; 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0HAND Q2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 OA 5.0FLY:NO Q3 10.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 6.25 10.0 45.0FD ti 59 56 52 52 53 57 56
Q1 90.0 15.0 0.0	 0.0 15.0 50.0 65.5
HAND	 Q2 100.0 50.0 0.0	 10.0 30.0 55.0 90.0
FLY:FD	 Q3 100.0 80.0 2.75	 20.0 50.0 77.5 100.0
N 68 66 61	 61 66 6S 64
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PHASE OF FLIGHT
Takeof I	 Trami- Crtuse Descent Tcrmi- Final Land-
FEA'f'U E I	 to 1000
AGL
lion
	 &
E-n-
^ I	 Use
to
naJ
Area
Ap
proacb
ing
route 10,000
J Climb NIS L)_
VERTI	 Q1 0.0 0.0 0.0 22.5 20.0 0.0 0.0
CAL	 Q2 0.0 10.0 0.0 50.0 50.0 0.0 0.0
SPEED	 Q3 I	 0.0I!
30.0 0.0 85.0 80.0 20.0 0.0
N 54 89 4-3 92 89 64 32
BANK	 Q1 II
LIMIT	 Q2
0.0
`	 90.0
50.0
90.0
62.5
100.0
50.0
100.0
23.75
75.0
2.5
80.0
0.0
80.0
Q3 100.0 100.0 100.0 l 00.0 100.0 100.0 100.0AUTO
N 77 94 92 94 89 83 57
BANK	 Q1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
LIMIT	 Q2 0.0 25.0 7.5 10.0 50.0 25.0 10.0
MANUAL	 Q3 50.0 57.5 100.0 56.25 100.0 100.0 95.0N 71 _ 87 80 81 89 83 56
Q1 0.0 80.0 95.0 90.050.0 0.0 0.0
LINAN 	 Q2 0.0 90.0 100.0 95.0 60.0 25.0 0.0Q3 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 85.0 71.25 50.0
N 58 100 100 96 96 73 46
Q1 0.0 0.0 0.0 I	 0.0 I	 0.0 0.0 0.0
VNAV
	
Q2 I	 0.0 5.0 10.0 0.0 I	 0.0 0.0 0.0Q3 I	 0.0 75.0 95.0 50.0 8.75 0.0 0.0
N 36	 1 50 43 45 (	 39 35 27
Q1 I	 0.0 72.5 0.0 22.5 20.0 0.0 0.0
n CH	 Q2 !	 0.0 90.0 10.0 50.0 50.0 0.0 0.0Q3 0.0 100.0 100.0 80.0 80.0 20.0 0.0
N 52 100 41 96 40 50 23
AP-	 Q1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 I
0.0 50.0 10.0
PROACN	 Q2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 22S 60.0 60.0
MODE	 Q3 0.0 0.0 U.0 U.0
I
50.0 80.0 76.25
N 15 13 11 12 28 96 57
Q1 '	 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.88
AUTO-
	 Q2 I	 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 5.0
LAND
	 Q3 I 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 10.0
N i5 13 12 13	 I 13 43 89
Table B. Frequency of Us,- (con)
0Table B. Fre,_ ,• °ncy of Use (con)
I
PHASE OF FLIGHT
Takeoff Traa-,i- Cruise
I
i	 D----crnt ( Tel., Final Land-
FEATURE to 1000 tion	 & (Cl W se nal Ap- ing
AGL En- to Area proach
route 10,000
Climb	 _ NISL)
Q1 i	 90.0 100.0 98.0	 70.0 63.0 25.0	 0.0
A li TO	 Q2 1 00.0 100.0 100.0
	 90.0 80 0 50.0	 7.5
THROTTLE
	 Q3 I00.0 100.0 100.0
	 I	 100.0 100.0 80.0	 C	 40.0
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anomalous situations.	 Human factors principles of cockpit design are
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